An excerpt from, "Nicholas II, Wilhelm II and the 1905 Treaty of Björkö" By Paul Gilbert, July 26, 2023:
On 24th (O.S. 11th) July 1905 – Emperor Nicholas II and German Emperor Wilhelm II, met off the Finnish coast, where they signed the Treaty of Björkö, a secret Russian-German defense accord between the two empires. It was never ratified due to opposition from authoritative political circles on both sides, mainly because it was directed against existing alliance commitments between Russia and France.
On the evening of Sunday 23rd July 1905, the Kaiser arrived at Koivisto Sound from Viipuri Bay on his yacht, the Hohenzollern, dropping anchor near the Russian Imperial Yacht, the Polar Star.
Nicholas II transferred from the Polar Star in a launch, taking him to the SMS Berlin – which had escorted the German emperor’s yacht – and lay anchor in the bay. He was greeted by Wilhelm II, who personally escorted his Russian cousin on an inspection tour of the newly commissioned cruiser of the German Imperial Navy.
Evidence of the meeting is given in telegrams that the two emperors exchanged, titled the Willy–Nicky correspondence. The letters were made public in 1917 by the new Provisional Government in Russia, and later translated to English.
Wilhelm II’s efforts were linked to the Entente cordiale between France and England concluded in 1904 and at the same time tensions between England and Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, which raised hopes of drawing Russia to the side of the German Empire.
The Kaiser had been trying for some time to reach a treaty with Russia and on 27th October 1904 had a draft treaty sent to the Tsar, which he had worked out with Reich Chancellor von Bülow. In July 1905, due to political developments in Russia, the Kaiser finally saw an opportunity to realize it.
Wilhelm II was the chief author of the Treaty of Björkö, also known as the Treaty of Koivisto, but he acted without first consulting with his ministers. This secret mutual defence treaty was signed at a meeting that had been arranged by Wilhelm himself only four days beforehand.
The initiative to conclude a treaty belonged to German diplomacy, which sought to destroy the Russian-French alliance and prevent the creation of the Entente. To this end, it was supposed to turn the Russian-German alliance into a tripartite Russian-German-French, directed against Great Britain, the traditional rival of Russia (in Asia) and France (in Africa).
An excerpt from, "The Kaiser's Secret Negotiations with the Tsar, 1904-1905" By Sidney B. Fay, The American Historical Review, Vol. 24, No. 1. Oct., 1918, Pgs. 68 - 72:
Such was the Treaty of Bjorko. It was not suddenly improvised on July 24, 1905. It was the culmination of plans which the Kaiser had had in view ever since the Kiel regatta in June, I904. It was what he had aimed to secure in the fall of 1904 after the Dogger Bank episode, but, being then unsuccessful, he had accepted faute de mieux the coaling agreement. The Bjorko Treaty was in form a defensive alliance, but, taken in connection with the understanding in regard to Denmark, was obviously directed against England. It was in conflict with the spirit of the Dual Alliance and would consequently have overthrown the foundation on which Russian foreign policy had rested since 1891. The specious provision for the adhesion of France was incapable of execution, as the situation then was. France, suddenly confronted by the united force of a Russo-German alliance, would have been compelled, as has already been suggested, to choose between two alternatives: either she would have had to subordinate herself as an impotent third party to a combination of two great empires, both dominated in fact by the Kaiser; or she would have been forced to give up the Dual Alliance and stand isolated (except so far as England offered support) before the Kaiser's menacing power. To the Kaiser it would have made little difference which alternative France chose. In either case he would have extricated Germany from that position of isolation into which his own unwise policy had brought her, he would have an ally in case of war with England and Germany would again have weakened and humiliated France.
. . . Not the least interesting point in regard to the Bjorko Treaty is what became of it. When the Tsar parted from the Kaiser at Bjorko, he returned to Tsarskoe-Selo with the secret treaty in his possession, and laid it away, not mentioning its existence to anyone. But he could not long so leave it. For according to article III. of the treaty, it was to become effective at the conclusion of peace between Russia and Japan. This took place at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on September 5. The Tsar therefore decided to inform Count Lamsdorf and the others who ought to know of its existence. Count Lamsdorf "could not believe his eyes or ears". He instantly saw the danger for France and the necessity of nullifying the treaty. He explained to the Tsar the significance of what he had done. He made it clear how contrary the treaty was to the spirit of the Dual Alliance, and how unlikely it was that France could be forced, volens nolens, into such a triple combination. He re-enforced his own views by those of the Russian ambassador at Paris. The Tsar was finally convinced and instructed Lamsdorf to take steps to annul the treaty. Not trusting any further secret diplomacy between the sovereigns, Lamsdorf decided to entrust the Russian ambassador at Berlin, Count Osten-Sacken, with the disagreeable but necessary task of informing the Kaiser that the Treaty of Bjorko was incompatible with Russia's obligations to France and therefore could not be executed.Great was the Kaiser's vexation when he received this communication. But he did not believe the treaty was yet lost---for he hoped that he had insured himself against failure by getting Witte's support for a triple combination between Germany, Russia, and France. Therefore, he refused to regard Osten-Sacken's communication as final, and despatched to the Tsar in quick succession the strongly worded telegrams of October 12 and 15, 1905. With arguments and appeals intended to hold the Tsar fast to his promise, he urged that the treaty did not collide with the Dual Alliance, and anyway,Your ally has notoriously left you in the lurch during the whole war, whereas Germany helped you in every way as far as it could without infringing the laws of neutrality. That puts Russia morally also under obligations to us; do ut des. Meanwhile the indiscretions of Delcasse have shown the world that though France is your ally she nevertheless made an agreement with England and was on the verge of surprising Germany, with British help, in the middle of peace, while I was doing my best to you and your country, her ally. . . . Our Moroccan business is regulated to entire satisfaction, so that the air is free for better understanding between us. Our treaty is a very good base to build upon. We joined hands and signed before God, who heard our vows. I therefore think that the treaty can well come into existence. . . What is signed is signed, and God is our testator.M. Witte had left St. Petersburg for America on July 19 two hours before the arrival of the Kaiser's suggestion for the Bjorko meeting. He left Russia famed as a financier and a builder of the Trans-Siberian railway. He returned from Portsmouth with the added reputation of being a great diplomat, and no one was more conscious of his diplomatic success than M. Witte himself. He had long desired to see closer relations between the three great Continental Powers. In his mind Germany represented power, France wealth. By allying herself with both, Russia would benefit by the strength of the one and the financial resources of the other. When, therefore, he received a telegram from the Kaiser inviting him to stop at Rominten on his way back to Russia, he thought the opportunity had come for furthering these closer relations. The quasi-royal fashion in which the Kaiser received him at Rominten on September 26 gratified Witte further. He was soon informed by his host of the fact that a treaty had been signed at Bjorko, providing for a defensive alliance, to which France was to be invited to become a member. But he was not shown the text of the treaty and did not grasp its real intent. Supposing that the Kaiser intended a defensive alliance, into which Germany, Russia, and France should enter voluntarily and as equals, he congratulated the Kaiser on his plan, but pointed out that since its success depended on securing the adhesion of France, France must no longer be exasperated in the Moroccan negotiations. The Kaiser agreed and telegraphed on the spot to Prince von Billow to withdraw the demand that the frontier between Algiers and Morocco should be one of the questions which must be discussed at the conference of Algeciras. In passing through Paris, on his return from Portsmouth, M. Witte had learned that the refusal of the French to submit this question for discussion by the Powers had caused great irritation and brought a deadlock in the Moroccan negotiations. It was thus, as a result of the Rominten interview, that two days later it was possible at Paris to sign the Franco-German accord of September 28 by which all the questions to be discussed at the conference of Algeciras were finally settled.When, however, M. Witte arrived in Russia from Rominten, was shown the text of the Bjorko Treaty, and confronted with the arguments of Count Lamsdorf against it, he also saw the necessity for its annulment. In the midst of the revolutionary fermentation which resulted in the Tsar's famous constitutional manifesto of October 30, Count Witte wrote a letter to Berlin in which he argued against the validity of the Bjorko Treaty on the ground that it lacked the signature of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs; he also pointed out that a sovereign is too insufficiently informed on foreign affairs to act without the advice of his responsible minister. Prince von Billow replied that he was not aware that such ministerial responsibility existed in Russia and repeated his master's words, "What is signed is signed."Not to be thus checked, Count Witte, acting in concert with Count Lamsdorf, adopted a more effective procedure. A letter was drawn up for Nicholas II to send to the Kaiser, explaining to him why it was impossible for Russia to give effect to the treaty; it suggested in place of the treaty a declaration of friendly assurances. But this letter, instead of being sent by the personal military attache of one of the emperors, was forwarded in the regular diplomatic way to the Russian embassy in Berlin. It was accompanied by a letter of instructions from Count Lamsdorf to Count Osten-Sacken, directing him to repeat to the German government the declaration in the Tsar's personal letter to the Kaiser. The unmistakable clearness of the language in these communications had its effect in Berlin, and the Tsar was thus liberated from the engagements which he had so inconsiderately entered into at Bjorko.
