Wilhelm Leopold Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz (12 August 1843 – 19 April 1916), also known as Goltz Pasha, was a Prussian Field Marshal and military writer.
From the 1870s until World War I, Baron von der Goltz was more widely read by British and American military leaders than Clausewitz.
International Encyclopedia of the First World War:
Goltz’ most important work was “The Nation in Arms” (1883). It was an introduction to the contemporary state of the military and the future of warfare. For Goltz, in the age of mass armies, a short conflict like that of 1870-1871 was highly improbable. Future wars would lead to the total exhaustion of nations, and, therefore, the separation of civilian and soldier would no longer be appropriate. In these thoughts, Goltz clearly adapted the idea of the French levée en masse and added his own concept of the role of the armed forces within society. Goltz made use of popular Social Darwinist ideas of his time, especially in the sense that only the fittest nation would survive in the struggle among states. Therefore, military norms and practices should be accepted as normal by civilian society. Beyond that, Goltz claimed that the officer corps should have a leading role within society. The general (Feldherr), not necessarily of noble origin, should impose his will on the whole society in times of danger, a rather subliminal call for military dictatorship in war. The general “must, therefore, be born more to rule men than to please them.” Goltz’ idea of a professional army led by a distinguished officer corps was welcomed in the German army, whereas the mobilization of the whole nation (Volkskrieg) was declined for its conspicuous Republican and revolutionary spirit. “The Nation in Arms” also had a global impact on military thinking, and was even read in the officer corps of nations hostile to Germany.
Goltz had been the head of the German military mission to the Ottoman Empire (1883-1895). He also served as an advisor to the Ottoman army after the 1908 revolution. This was facilitated by Goltz’ former students who had taken key positions in the Ottoman high command after the deposition of Abdülhamid II, Sultan of the Turks (1842-1918). Among those former students and their followers in the Ottoman war academy, Goltz found enthusiastic supporters of his ideas. This was even more the case since in the course of the Ottoman defeats in 1912-1913, Goltz defended the predominance of the Ottoman Muslims, who made up the biggest part of the Ottoman officer corps. The appropriation of his Social Darwinist accented theses of national unity was to have fatal consequences in the last period of the Ottoman Empire. For Ismail Enver Pasha (1881-1922), main actor in the genocide of the Armenians, Goltz’ “Nation in Arms” was the “alphabet dans mon métier.”
An excerpt from, "The Nation in Arms" By Goltz Pasha, 1887, (Pgs. 2 - 6):
It is, however, perfectly natural that the great civilised nations of the present should bring to ever greater perfection their military equipments, in order, when occasion requires, to be enabled to put forth all their strength. The day of Cabinet wars is over. It is no longer the weakness of a single man, at the head of affairs, or of a dominant party, that is decisive, but only the exhaustion of the belligerent nations. The French nation asserts, even to-day, that it did not desire the war of 1870. But, when the Empire which declared this war fell, the same nation was at once ready to carry it on to the bitter end. The man who, in 1870, had been most earnest in his warnings not to declare war rashly, in September headed the nation, and took upon himself the leadership of the armies, only to become the most zealous instigator of the bloody struggle. Wars have become the sole concern of the nations engaged. And he, too, who is personally averse to military operations, feels the duty incumbent upon him of devoting himself entirely to them so soon as the victory or the defeat of his country is at stake. There is no one who would not deem such sentiments a virtue. A collision of interests leads to war, but the passions of the nations decide, independently of these, up to what point the war shall be carried. War aids politics in the attainment of their objects; yet, for the sake of subordinate interests, it must be waged until the enemy has been completely subjected. This necessarily entails the decisive use of all means, intellectual and material alike, tending to subjugate the foe; and it is, consequently, right and equitable in time of peace to prepare all available resources with a view to their being employed in war when occasion demands.
If, from humanitarian prinoiples, a nation decided not to resort to extremities, but to employ all its strength towards stopping at a preconcerted point, it would soon find itself hurried forward against its will. No enemy would consider itself bound to observe a similar limitation. So far from this being the case, each would immediately avail itself of the voluntary withdrawal of the other, to outstrip it at once in armaments.
"Now humane souls may easily conceive that an artificial disarming or subjecting of the enemy might be effected without causing too many wounds, and that this is the true aim of all military science. Pretty as that looks," says Clausewitz, '' we must refute this error, for, in such dangerous matters as war, errors which arise from good-nature are the worst of all. As the employment of physical force to its fullest extent in no wise excludes the cooperation of intelligence, it follows that he who makes use of this force regardlessly, and without sparing blood, must obtain an ascendancy, if the enemy does not do likewise. By so doing he frames a law for the other, and each competes with the other without there being any other limit but the inherent counterpoise."
And thus we have arrived at a perfect explanation. The fact that the sacrifices, which nations are called upon to make for the development of their military systems, lie heavy upon the shoulders of the living generation, cannot alter the case one jot. That nation which first began to retrograde in this respect would at once lose its position, its power, and its voice. It would have to bear the expense of every conflict that arose, and, taught by bitter experience, would very soon prefer to begin to arm like others, in order to make up for lost time. All disarmament projects are framed in misconception of our present political life, which proceeds from the tribal consanguinity of nations. Owing to the community of interests, which to-day prevails in every nation, the various peoples confront one another like persons among whom a natural inherent selfishness, even though some of them may display goodwill, is the source of disputes. National egotism is inseparable from our ideas of national greatness. This egotism will always appeal to arms when other means fail, and where should an arbiter's tribunal be found which were capable of dictating peace? Only a world-empire could do this. But world-empires owe their being to wars, and are inseparable from wars.
. . .We must certainly reflect that, from the great expenditure entailed by a military system, an exhaustion may gradually arise which will sap the martial strength and vigour of the nation. The enigma to be solved in the present development of things is how to completely fuse the military life into the life of the people, so that the former may impede the latter as little as possible, and that, on the other hand, all the resources of the latter may find expression in the former. Universal military service has taken the most important step in this direction, for, since its introduction, those forming the standing army are no longer permanently, but only temporarily, withdrawn from work, and all healthy men are placed at the disposition of the military system.
True it is that the sacrifices, which this institution has, since its first introduction, demanded, have increased in a manner that was formerly held to be impossible. Yet this circumstance also demands to be regarded in the right light. Compared with the older system, a diminution of them can be proved. If a great Continental Power in these days wished to organise an army in the old fashion, viz. by enlistment, an army strong enough to play a great part, the expenses of the undertaking would run into enormous figures.
But, as the fusion of the military system with the national and political life leads, when compared with the great results, to a diminution of the sacrifices demanded, so, despite all appearances, does the turning to acooant of the advance of civilisation for the purposes of war likewise enhance the humanity of belligerent operations. The foe is conquered, not by the destruction of his existence, but by the annihilation of his hopes of victory.
"Fighting to the last man" as we may add to quiet uneasy minds, is only a strong figure of speech expressing a determination to fight bravely. It would sound curious if an army were to vow, before battle, to fight until it lost twenty per cent., and yet this would be more, and much more, than sufficient. As a rule, a loss of half this number on either side is sufficient to decide the victory. The destruction of a part of the whole withholds the rest from further exertions, and ends the struggle. The more surprising and the more crushing the effects of the weapons are, the sooner do they produce a decisive result, and thus it is shown that the battles are, as a rule, less bloody in proportion as the engines of destruction have attained greater perfection.
A single modern artillery projectile slays at one blow ten or twenty men, and produces an effect such as was only, perhaps, attained in former days after double the number had fallen victims to single bullets. In like manner, the effect of the fire of small arms has also been increa^ad. We may compute it at 60 to 100 times that of the days when the Swedish musketeers boasted of their superiority over the Imperials (Eaiserlichen) because they only required twelve, whilst the latter took fifteen minutes to load their flint-locks.
The single engagements are far more terrible than formerly. But, to counterbalance this, they produce a much greater moral impression, and this latter, again, makes the whole struggle less bloody. No battle of modem times, in spite of all the military energy displayed and the enhanced effect of the weapons of war, has produced such carnage as did those of Eylau or Borodino. But most bloody of all were the battles of ancient times, in which the attack was made with a club or the short Roman sword.
The fact that each new invention and each new advance of technical science seeks, in these days, to be utilised in military service need not, therefore, alarm us, or appear to us aught else than a retrogressive step taken in tbe direction of hamanity and ciyilisation. By these means, on the contrary, the battle is only the more rapidly decided, and the war sooner brought to an end ; and that is certainly to be desired, because war, in these modern times, by displaying itself in its natural and violent form, convulses all creation, and makes it quake to its foundations.
