"[T]he secret of propaganda [is to] permeate the person it aims to grasp, without his even noticing that he is being permeated. Of course propaganda has a purpose, but the purpose must be concealed with such cleverness and virtuosity that the person on whom this purpose is to be carried out doesn't notice it at all." - Joseph Goebbels, Propaganda Minister for Nazi Germany.
It is a mistake to assume that wartime propaganda is directed primarily at the masses.
The majority of inspired and sophisticated propaganda literature is produced for the elite of any given society. Those who have influence over the levers of power, decision-making, and currents of public thought, are deserving of greater attention than regular voters.
The masses can be swayed in any direction fairly easily, but with the elite it takes more persuasive power and poetic subtlety.
In modern times the British perfected the art of wartime propaganda. They are the masters of thought and cultural persuasion. The Nazis learned everything from them. They were schoolchildren compared to them. The Germans possess little sophistication in the realm of propaganda.
And whereas the Jews, Russians, and Americans use crude techniques like blackmail, money, and sexual espionage to intimidate their political targets, the Brits rely on good old-fashioned charm and upper class grace to persuade their prey to their side.
Who charmed the bedouins in the Arabian desert? Who has enlisted the elites of Islamic countries, and those of many other societies to do their bidding?
The Nazis, Americans, Russians, and Jews cannot hold a candle to these people.
The persuasive powers of the British ruling class are unmatched.
II.
An excerpt from, "An Overview of British Propaganda Efforts in the First World War" By Robert St John Smith, April 18, 2024:
While an official propaganda organisation might not have existed in Britain, neither was it starting from an entirely blank state. Pre-war thinking had foreseen the need to control information in a modern war, evidenced by one of Britain's very first official acts of war, which was to order the Post Office ship, HMTS Alert, to cut the Germans' transatlantic telegraph cables that passed through the English Channel, severing Germany's ability to communicate across the globe. In addition, The Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) was passed, which, among other things, gave the government a statutory right to limit the freedom of the press, though it was rarely used in this manner. Control of the press until this point had been a voluntary matter, which had its roots in 1899 where it was agreed there needed to be a mutual agreement between press and government, and it was precedented in 1912 when the press was asked not to report on work being undertaken by the Ordinance Board — this was an agreement which seemed to have worked well for both parties. Thus, responsibility for censorship was to fall under the War Office. Convention dictated that senior officers were permitted informal contact with the press, however, reflecting the thinking of the day, Lord Kitchener instituted tighter controls. As well as controlling the flow of information, the War Office would become responsible for the censorship of mail, cables and wireless under the moniker of MO5 (military operations). While pre-war planning had predicted this need — and much is intrinsically tied into the origins of the Security and Secret Services (MI5 and MI6) — it was unprepared to meet the demand for information. The War Office hastily formed the Official Press Bureau (OPB) as a point-of-contact, but given no specific aims or duties, its first weeks were marred by poor administration. Despite Churchill's declaration that the OPB would provide a 'steady stream of information', it censored more than it released, earning the nickname 'the Suppress Bureau'. While their strategy was to be one of control, a sub-section of MO5 — MO5(h) — was set up for 'frontline propaganda', in response to German efforts, which had seen leaflets dropped over the French town of Nancy in August. Leaflet drops aimed to lower enemy morale, but how much work of this nature was undertaken in this wave is hard to establish, given its links to intelligence and this being an under-studied field, but it was low in comparison to later activity discussed below.
From the outbreak, it was Allied policy that war would be waged economically, as well as on the battlefields, and that the Royal Navy would play the principal role, by using its might to enact a blockade of Germany. For this blockade to be effective, it was vital the government shored up support of neutral countries like the Netherlands and Sweden, who would be economically impacted by the blockade.22 Britain also needed to respond to the growing surge of anti-British propaganda produced by Germany in both neutral and allied countries, as well as show its allies that it was capable of pulling its weight, and in the hope of attracting further allies. This led to the Foreign Office creating the News Department of the Foreign Office (NDFO), which acted as the source for all statements issued by the government relating to foreign policy, as well as maintaining relationships with foreign journalists and H.M representatives in embassies across the world. Without input from the Foreign Office, but in connection with the OPB, around the same time the Home Office set up the Neutral Press Committee (NPC), which would monitor press in neutral countries, promote English newspaper sales overseas, oppose enemy propaganda overseas, and distribute information via cable and wireless. Both new organisations, like the OPB, were set up with little in the way of practical aims, and the fact that there were now three overlapping organisations was the start of many tensions within Whitehall and beyond.
In terms of neutral countries, the most important target was the US, not only to compensate for economic losses (Britain and Germany had been each other's 'best' customers), but to secure the resources it could bring as an ally. This matter had been raised by cabinet, and it was rumoured that the following exchange did not take place in the confines of Parliament, or Downing Street, but at a Sunday luncheon at a golf club, where Lloyd George asked his cabinet college Charles Frederick Gurney Masterman (1873-1927) to 'look into it'. The result was the formation of a fourth organisation, Wellington House, named after the building it was based in, but officially known as the War Propaganda Bureau, with Masterman at its head.
Criminally, as he is a character worthy of further analysis, only one biography exists of Masterman, written by his wife in 1939. His career before becoming an MP involved being the literary editor of the Daily Chronicle but his political career got off to a promising start, being associated with the Young Radical Liberals, which centred around Bertrand Russell. He was elected to the seat of Dulwich West in 1906 and undertook a number of junior ministerial posts — possibly the most interesting in relation to propaganda was his involvement with the 1912 introduction of Lloyd George's National Insurance scheme when he was undersecretary for the Home Office. This was a role that saw him oversee an until-then unprecedented and innovative public relations drive, where he was hands on in organising material, leading some commentators to say that he was the most experienced propagandist at the start of the war.
Masterman could be described as 'The Thinker's Propagandist' — especially compared to other individuals discussed here. His approach and vision was influenced by psychological works on crowd behaviour of the time, a topic he took much interest in, and he believed persons without much education or worldly experience were more likely 'not to be in charge of their own fates and open to manipulation'. As such, Wellington House propaganda was to target the elites, not the masses.30 With the aid of Sir Gilbert Parker (1862-1932), a Canadian novelist and anglophile, who was to be made Director of American Propaganda at Wellington House, a targeted list of some 260,000 influential individuals within the US was created.31 Masterman also believed that for the propaganda to be successful its origin would need to be secret: works should appear as if the authors had produced them under their own steam — what would now be called 'black propaganda'. In September 1914, Masterman held two conferences, the first with some 35 influential writers and academics — including many professional and social friends, including H.G. Wells, Arnold Bennett, Rudyard Kipling, and Arthur Conan-Doyle. Attendees were invited to produce work based on accurate information and measured argument through private publishing houses that hid their governmental source. By May 1915, Wellington House had produced 'over seven million copies of books and pamphlets, translated into sixteen languages'. Notably, given the popularity of some of the authors, it is worth highlighting that any of the work they produced during the war is most likely to be propaganda, but how much encouragement they needed is debatable, certainly in the case of Arthur Conan-Doyle, who pre-war had written much on the topic, concerning the rise in German militarism and the threat it presented.
Wikipedia - Sir Gilbert Parker:
The British put forth a large effort to find an able and persuasive writer to effectively communicate with the Americans during World War I. Parker played a crucial and significant role in that propaganda. On 2 September 1914, Parker was chosen by Charles Masterman and the British government to head the subdivision of Wellington House that was responsible for American propaganda.[citation needed] He was unpaid and had no formal title for this role. The goal was to convince America to support the British cause in the war. Parker was supplied with a "large propaganda office" to plan, write, and distribute the new technique of British propaganda.
His main objective was to create new relationships and hold onto existing ones with American citizens.
To do this, Gilbert showered the American people with writings from people such as Rudyard Kipling, H. G. Wells, John Galsworthy, Arnold Bennett, and George Bernard Shaw. His own writings, known as the "White Papers," were sent into the New York Times in 1914. The subheading of one article read, "A Modest Appeal from Sir Gilbert Parker to read the British Side."
His strategic marriage to Amy VanTine, his reputation as a writer, and his social status among the American people, allowed him to establish friendships with many influential Americans in all professions. Using his fame and character, Sir Gilbert Parker flattered the American press with eloquent words and compliments. He called the Americans "fighting people". He also said that "this war will prove them to have everything that they have always had—courage, swiftness if conception, capacity to perform, and a lightning-like directness." His writings essentially "educated" the one source that he knew would reach the majority of Americans. However, he didn't stop there: he continued to spread his "knowledge" by distributing "propaganda material" to American libraries, educational institutions, and periodicals. While focusing on professional establishments he continued to create personal relationships with American elites such as college professors, scientists, doctors, politicians, etc. His method of establishing personal relationships was a landmark later used in other methods of propaganda, "it was the complete and skillful technique later to be developed by many other propagandists, lobbyists, and public relations council."
. . .Parker continued his propaganda efforts up until the year the United States entered the war, 1917. At the beginning of 1917, he visited the United States to meet with Americans he had been corresponding with. On 3 February 1917, President Woodrow Wilson made a speech during Parker's visit that severed diplomatic ties with Germany. The U.S. had almost declared war and Parker believed that he had fulfilled his responsibilities. Later that same day, he resigned from his position at Wellington House, due to failing health, he said.
All of Wellington House's activities were kept in complete secrecy. This increased the credibility of their publications, because they could not be traced back to any official sources. Parker's letters concealed their connection and origin with the British government, and his American contacts never realized they were being manipulated. Today his influence on the First World War and America's entry into it is often overlooked, even by seemingly comprehensive propaganda analysis.
Charles Frederick Gurney Masterman PC MP (24 October 1873 – 17 November 1927) was a British radical Liberal Party politician, intellectual and man of letters. He worked closely with such Liberal leaders as David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill in designing social welfare projects, including the National Insurance Act 1911. During the First World War, he played a central role in the main government propaganda agency.
. . .In the summer of 1914, Masterman strongly supported British entry into the First World War and was soon appointed as head of the War Propaganda Bureau (WPB), known as "Wellington House." His Bureau enlisted the eminent writers John Buchan, H. G. Wells, and Arthur Conan Doyle, as well as the painters Francis Dodd and Paul Nash. Before its abolition in 1917, the Bureau published some 300 books and pamphlets in 21 languages, distributed over 4,000 propaganda photographs every week, and circulated maps, cartoons and lantern slides to the media.
. . .A major objective of his department was to encourage the United States to enter the war on the British and French side. Lecture tours and exhibitions of paintings were organised in the US, drawing on an extensive network of the most important and influential figures in the London arts scene, Masterman devising the most comprehensive arts patronage schemes ever to be supported in the country. It was subsumed into Buchan's Department of Information. It became a template for the war art scheme in the Second World War, headed by Sir Kenneth Clark.[13] Lloyd George demoted Masterman in February 1917; he now reported to Buchan. The agency was peremptorily closed as soon as the war ended, and neither Masterman nor Buchan received the usual public honours. However, Masterman followed Lloyd George in his Liberal party maneuvers after 1918.
