"The other danger posed by the threat of an Ottoman navy in the Gulf was that, by casting doubts on British paramountcy, it might revive Arab piracy. Poor Arab traders would be tempted to return to plunder, if they thought they could play British and Ottoman authorities against each other. This would be a retrograde step, since British ambitions to secure order in the Gulf were increasing significantly in the mid-1840s. In 1846, Hennell agreed informally with the Persian governor of Fars that British ships would police the Persian shore looking for pirates, though this agreement was not made public. In 1845, Muscat bowed to British pressure and agreed to confine its slave trading to the African coast rather than the Gulf. In 1847, the Porte agreed to forbid Ottoman vessels and subjects from engaging in the slave trade, giving British warships limited rights of search and seizure over them. Meanwhile, Hennell persuaded the Trucial shaykhs to ban the slave trade in 1847. Britain's assault on the slave trade, as on piracy, was part of its aim of creating an ordered space for free commerce.
. . .Ottoman assertiveness, however, merely encouraged the British to secure their own position in the Gulf to head off any challenge. When the maritime truce in the Gulf expired after ten years, it was replaced by a permanent truce in 1853, guaranteed by the British resident and negotiated by Hennell's successor Kemball. It offered the shaykhs permanent protection and "peace in perpetuity." All the Trucial rulers agreed to prevent hostilities between them, and to rely on the British authorities to obtain reparations for any act of aggression on them. The Ottoman navy in the Gulf remained a phantom for some decades. Meanwhile, in 1861, the British met continuing threats to Bahrain, from the Saudis and others, with the first of several treaties guaranteeing its independence. The local British representatives rejected Ottoman claims to sovereignty, either in the Gulf or over Faysal, and insisted that Gulf security was a British responsibility.
So naval power guaranteed British authority on the coast. Whether it could also improve the economic condition of the pashalik of Baghdad was a greater challenge." -
An excerpt from, "Promised Lands: The British and the Ottoman Middle East" by Jonathan Parry, Princeton University Press, 2022, Pg. 307 - 309. More here.
"As part of their offensive, British forces seized the canal. Lesseps denounced the seizure as a violation of the canal's neutrality, but British troops had in fact occupied the entire country. Several years passed before an international convention declared that the Suez Canal should never be closed to ships of any nation by any nation, and in the interim, the British established a protectorate over Egypt. While the khedive ruled in name, along with a prime minister and an assembly, the British government held ultimate authority, and the British consul general, Lord Cromer, was the final arbiter of what the government could and could not do." - An excerpt from, "Parting The Desert: The Creation of the Suez Canal" by Zachary Karabell, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2003, Pg. 266
The British brought law and order to the Persian Gulf and surrounding waters when they arrived. They elevated civilization. Muslim piracy and the Muslim slave trade were real problems in the 19th century. The Ottomans weren't interested in addressing those issues and Iran wasn't strong enough to do anything about them even if it wanted.
That's not the case now. The origin of the chaos lies outside the Persian Gulf, and is a direct result of U.S. policy over the span of multiple decades.
In the past fifty years it's been the British and American installed regimes in the Persian Gulf countries, from Saddam to the Ayatollahs, and the Arab tribal kings, who have been causing trouble and mischief, each in their turn.
America and England have used both Iraq and Iran to help police the waters and keep the territorial ambitions of each other in check. And, should they step out of line, like Saddam did with Kuwait, they received harsh slaps.
This was not an exercise in international law, but naval power.
Power enabled the Anglo-American empire to run roughshod in the Persian Gulf and basically command the various puppet states to do its bidding.
But that's only part of the story. In geostrategic bodies of water that are hard to navigate, whether the Middle East or elsewhere, Western technology liberated trade. That fact is undeniable.
But it was, and still is, a dog eat dog world. French ingenuity built the Suez Canal, and British power seized it. They didn't ask nicely either.
And power will once again shape the new security and economic arrangement in the Persian Gulf. I think it's paramount for regional security and international stability that both Iran and Iraq have a strong say.
The days of isolating either one should not be brought back. As for their obnoxious southern neighbours, they need to learn some gratitude and avoid playing the role of spoiler.
Trump can get a major political win here if he has his head screwed on straight and helps orchestrate a new and fair order. He can have some island near the Strait of Hormuz named after him if glory and fame is what he's after.
