May 27, 2026

Foch

 


Wikipedia:

Ferdinand Foch (October 1851 – 20 March 1929) was a French general, Marshal of France and a member of the Académie Française and Académie des Sciences. He distinguished himself as Supreme Allied Commander on the Western Front during the First World War in 1918.

. . .Foch was later acclaimed as "the most original military thinker of his generation". He was a disciple of Napoleon, and made use of the lessons taught by Moltke. He became known for his critical analyses of the Franco-Prussian and Napoleonic campaigns and of their relevance to military operations in the new twentieth century. His re-examination of France's defeat in 1870 was among the first of its kind. At the college, Foch was a professor of military history, strategy, and general tactics while becoming the French theorist on offensive strategies. He also employed mathematical terms in his lectures.

During his time as an instructor, Foch created renewed interest in French military history, inspired confidence in a new class of French officers, and brought about "the intellectual and moral regeneration of the French Army". His thinking on military doctrine was shaped by the Clausewitzian philosophy, then uncommon in France, that "the will to conquer is the first condition of victory." Collections of his lectures, which reintroduced the concept of the offensive to French military theory, were published in the volumes "Des Principes de la Guerre" ("On the Principles of War") in 1903, and "De la Conduite de la Guerre" ("On the Conduct of War") in 1904. Both "thought" and "will" were the key words of these teachings. While Foch advised "qualification and discernment" in military strategy and cautioned that "recklessness in attack could lead to prohibitive losses and ultimate failure", his concepts, distorted and misunderstood by contemporaries, became associated with the extreme offensive doctrines (l' offensive à outrance) of his successors. The cult of the offensive came to dominate military circles, and Foch's reputation was damaged when his books were cited in the development of the disastrous offensives that brought France close to ruin and the army to mutiny in 1917.

Foch was seen as a master of the Napoleonic school of military thought, but he was the only one of the Military College Commandants (Maillard, Langlois, Bonnal) still serving. Their doctrines had been challenged, not only by the German school, but also since about 1911 by a new French school inspired by General Loiseau de Grandmaison, which criticised them as lacking in vigour and offensive spirit and contributing to needless dispersion of force. The French Army fought under the new doctrines, but they failed in the first battles of August 1914, and it remained to be seen whether the Napoleonic doctrine would hold its own, would give way to doctrines evolved during the war, or would incorporate the new moral and technical elements into a new outward form within which the spirit of Napoleon remained unaltered. The war gave an ambiguous answer to these questions, which remains a source of controversy among experts.

Video Title: Marshal Ferdinand Foch: Hero of the Great War, Knight of Columbus. Source: Knights of Columbus Supreme Council. Date Published: July 22, 2025.

May 26, 2026

J. F. C. Fuller

 


Wikipedia:

Major-General John Frederick Charles "Boney" Fuller (1 September 1878 – 10 February 1966) was a senior British Army officer, a military historian and strategist, a fascist, and an occultist.

During World War I, Fuller became a staff officer in the Tank Corps and helped plan the tank attack during the Battle of Cambrai. His Plan 1919 for a fully mechanised offensive against the German army was not implemented, due to the end of the war.

As a military theorist, Fuller was highly prolific and his ideas influenced army officers in Britain, Germany and the USA. He emphasised the potential of new weapons, especially tanks and aircraft, and was regarded as one of the progenitors of blitzkrieg.

. . .After the war Fuller, who in January 1919 was promoted to brevet colonel in recognition of "valuable services rendered in connection with the War", collaborated with his colleague B. H. Liddell Hart in developing new ideas for the mechanisation of armies, launching a crusade for the mechanisation and modernisation of the British Army. Chief instructor at the Staff College, Camberley from 1923, he served at the War Office as a GSO1 became military assistant to the chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1926. In what came to be known as the "Tidworth Incident", Fuller turned down the command of the Experimental Mechanized Force, which was formed on 27 August 1927. The appointment also carried responsibility for a regular infantry brigade and the garrison of Tidworth Camp on Salisbury Plain. Fuller believed he would be unable to devote himself to the Experimental Mechanized Force and the development of mechanized warfare techniques without extra staff to assist him with the additional extraneous duties, which the War Office refused to allocate. He was consulted on the development of warfare by Winston Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the summer of 1928. Fuller was promoted to major-general in 1930 and after refusing the command of the Second Class District of Bombay retired in December 1933 to devote himself entirely to writing.

. . .Fuller visited Nazi Germany regularly and came to know a number of the Nazi Party leaders. He frequently praised Adolf Hitler in his speeches and articles, once describing him as "that realistic idealist who has awakened the common sense of the British people by setting out to create a new Germany". He came to believe that the Nazis had created a "scientific" state. On 20 April 1939, Fuller was an honoured guest at Hitler's 50th birthday parade (attending "with official disapproval" along with Baron Brocket), watching as "for three hours a completely mechanised and motorised army roared past the Führer." Afterwards Hitler asked, "I hope you were pleased with your children?" Fuller replied, "Your Excellency, they have grown up so quickly that I no longer recognise them."

Fuller's ideas on mechanised warfare continued to be influential in the lead-up to the Second World War, ironically less with his countrymen than with the Nazis, notably Heinz Guderian who spent his own money to have Fuller's Provisional Instructions for Tank and Armoured Car Training translated. In the 1930s, the German Army implemented tactics similar in many ways to Fuller's analysis, which became known as Blitzkrieg. Like Fuller, theorists of Blitzkrieg partly based their approach on the theory that areas of large enemy activity should be bypassed to be eventually surrounded and destroyed. Blitzkrieg-style tactics were used by several nations throughout the Second World War, predominantly by the Germans in the invasion of Poland (1939), Western Europe (1940), and the Soviet Union (1941). 

. . .He continued to speak out in favour of a peaceful settlement with Germany. In July 1939, he was reported by the Evening Standard as the prospective BUF candidate at the 1940 general election. In October 1939, he conferred in private with Barry Domvile and Lancelot Lawton; a source described him on the occasion as "very interesting but very bloodthirsty". Between October 1939 and February 1940, he took part in a series of secret meetings held by the Marquess of Tavistock, a Hitler enthusiast, to discuss plans for collaboration with the Third Reich.

. . .By 1951, Fuller became a propagandist and supporter of the Munich-based Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, and he contributed to the crypto-fascist West German journal Nation Europa from 1951 to 1958. He later joined the League of Empire Loyalists, formed in 1954.

He spent his last years believing that the wrong side had won the Second World War. He most fully announced that thesis in the 1961 edition of The Reformation of War. There, he announced his belief that Hitler was the saviour of the West against the Soviet Union and denounced Churchill and Roosevelt for being too stupid to see so. Fuller died in Falmouth, Cornwall, in 1966.

. . .Fuller is perhaps best known today for his "Nine Principles of War" which have formed the foundation of much of modern military theory since the 1930s, and which were originally derived from a convergence of Fuller's mystical and military interests. The Nine Principles went through several iterations; Fuller stated that "the system evolved from six principles in 1912, rose to eight in 1915, to, virtually, nineteen in 1923, and then descended to nine in 1925". For example, notice how his analysis of General Ulysses S. Grant was presented in 1929.

The United States Army modified Fuller's list and issued its first list of the principles of war in 1921, making it the basis of advanced training for officers into the 1990s, when it finally reconceptualised its training.

. . .Cabalistic influences on his theories can be shown by his use of the "Law of Threes" throughout his work. Fuller did not believe the Principles stood alone as is thought today, but that they complemented and overlapped each other as part of a whole, forming the Law of Economy of Force.

. . .These Principles of War have been adopted and further refined by the military forces of several nations, most notably within NATO, and continue to be applied widely to modern strategic thinking.

An excerpt from, "The foundations of the science of war" by John Frederick Charles Fuller, 1926, London: Hutchinson & Co, Pg. 13-14:

The origins of this book may be of some interest, as the system outlined in it has been one of gradual growth, and, whatever value it may possess, it is the result of fifteen years' study and meditation.

In the autumn of 1911 I spent my leave in northern Germany, and returned to England convinced that a European war might break out at any moment. This realization stimulated my interest in military history, and to prepare myself for the inevitable and rapidly approaching struggle I turned to the Field Service Regulations (1909 edition) for assistance. On the first and second pages of Part 1. I found the following :

The fundamental principles of war are neither very numerous nor in themselves very abstruse, but the application of them is difficult, and cannot be made subject to rules. The correct application of principles to circumstances is the outcome of sound military know- ledge, built up by study and practice until it has become an instinct.

This was excellent, but what were these fundamental principles? If they are neither numerous nor abstruse they must be few and simple, but not one was mentioned in the book, consequently it appeared to that, unless I knew what they were, the Field Service Regulations was of little use. I determined, therefore, to discover these hidden truths.

I turned to the Correspondence of Napoleon and studied it closely, and during 1912 I had come to the conclusion that the principles which had guided Napoleon were as follows:

. . .The principle of the Objective--the true objective being that point at which the enemy may be most decisively defeated ; generally this point is to be found along the line of least resistance. The principle of Mass — that is, concentration of strength and effort at the decisive point. The principle of the Offensive ; the principles of Security, Surprise, and Movement (i.e. rapidly).

I had now got six working principles, and, being satisfied with them, I was able to devote more time to Hall and Knight's elementary mathematics, the bugbear of the old Staff College examination, which I passed in the summer of 1913.

Whilst at the Staff College I applied my principles and found them a great help. Then came the war, and, in December 1915, I wrote an anonymous article for the R.U.S.I. Journal entitled " The Principles of War with Reference to the Campaigns of 1914-15." This article was published in February 1916, and to the former six principles I added two new ones — the principle of economy of force and the principle of co-operation. In the summer of 1917 General Kentish, who was then in command of the Commanding Officers' School in Aldershot, asked me to lecture on these principles, and I did so, and also on several other occasions. In March 1918 my lecture was published by him as a pamphlet. 

So far these principles could only be looked upon as a pure hypothesis deduced from the campaigns of Napoleon and checked by the events of the Great War. In 1919 I was able to give them more thought, and I began to collect evidence in order to test them. This year a committee was assembled by the Army Council to rewrite the Field Service Regulations, and the chairman of this committee one day said to me : "I believe you have written something on the principles of war. May I have it ? ' I gave him a copy of the above-mentioned pamphlet. In 1920 the principles I had laid down were, in a slightly modified form, included in the new edition of the Field Service Regulations.

In July 1920 I wrote an article for the first number of The Army Quarterly entitled "The Foundations of the Science of War," in which my system was explained, and in 1922 I developed this system in chapter iii. of my book, The Reformation of War, which was published in February 1923. Between August 1922 and January 1923, being on half pay pending taking over an appointment at the Staff College, Camberley, I outlined and eventually wrote a series of some fifty lectures on "The Science of War " and "The Analysis of the Art of War." These lectures were given to the 1923 batch of Staff College Students, and were based on the following theory:

May 25, 2026

Balck

 


"Hermann Balck, Hitler’s Forgotten General" by Phillip Kay-Bujak (Pen & Sword Books, September 2025).


Wikipedia: 

Georg Otto Hermann Balck (7 December 1893 – 29 November 1982) was a highly decorated officer of the German Army who served in both World War I and World War II, rising to the rank of General der Panzertruppe.

. . .At the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Balck was serving in the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) as a staff officer in the Inspectorate of Motorized Troops, which was in charge of refitting and reorganizing the growing panzer forces. In October he was placed in command of one of the mechanised regiments of the 1st Panzer Division, with which he served during the Battle of France. The 1st Panzer Division made up a part of Guderian's panzer corps. Balck's regiment spearheaded a crossing over the Meuse, and established a bridgehead on the far side.

During the winter of 1940 through the spring of 1941 he commanded a panzer regiment, and led this unit during the Battle of Greece. He later commanded a panzer brigade in the same division. He returned to staff duties with the OKH in the Inspectorate of Armoured Forces in July 1941. In May 1942, Balck went to the Eastern Front in command of the 11th Panzer Division in Ukraine and southern Russia. Following the encirclement of the 6th Army at Stalingrad in the Soviet Operation Uranus, the German southern front faced a generalized collapse. Balck's division took part in the efforts to stop the Soviet advance. In battles along the Chir River his division destroyed an entire Soviet Tank Corps and much of the Soviet 5th Tank Army. For this and other achievements Balck was made one of only twenty-seven officers in the entire war who received the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds.

Description of "Hermann Balck, Hitler’s Forgotten General" by Phillip Kay-Bujak:

Though less famous than Rommel or von Manstein, Hermann Balck was considered by peers and enemies to be among the most talented German commanders of the Second World War. He was a veteran of the First World War, in which he served as a junior officer on the Western, Eastern, Italian and Balkan fronts and was wounded seven times. In 1940 he led the successful crossing of the River Meuse with dramatic consequences.

Balck led from the front in the new and very dynamic and aggressive command style of Auftragstaktik- continuously touring forward HQs to brief officers personally, regardless of personal risk. He refused two offers to join the General Staff preferring to remain in combat roles. Balck was a pivotal moving force behind the growth of the Panzer forces. In 1942 he commanded a depleted division against massive odds, virtually destroying Soviet 5th Tank Army. He was rewarded with the Knights Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds (one of only 27 recipients) He briefly commanded Grossdeutschland Panzergrenadier Division and suggested Hitler was wrong in how the Waffen-SS was constructed. Philip Kay-Bujak argues that, had Hitler ignored Balck's criticisms of the Waffen-SS and promoted him Field Marshal, Balck might have changed the course of the war on the Eastern Front. It was also Balck that nearly defeated the Americans at Salerno in 1943.

Commanding Army Group G, in 1944 he came up against General Patton but could not halt his advance in Alsace. First sacked then reinstated by Hitler, he fought on until surrendering to US forces on 8 May 1945 to avoid capture by the Soviets. Post-war, as a convicted war criminal, Balck chose obscurity and refused to take part in US interviews but by the 1980's he changed his mind on both and advised NATO on how to win a land war against Russia - his tactics are still relevant today.

"Order in Chaos: The Memoirs of General of Panzer Troops Hermann Balck" by Hermann Balck, University Press of Kentucky, 2015 (Google Books):

German general Hermann Balck (1897–1982) was considered to be one of World War II's greatest battlefield commanders. His brilliantly fought battles were masterpieces of tactical agility, mobile counterattack, and the technique of Auftragstaktik, or "mission command." However, because he declined to participate in the U.S. Army's military history debriefing program, today he is known only to serious students of the war.

Drawing heavily on his meticulously kept wartime journals, Balck discusses his childhood and his career through the First and Second World Wars. His memoir details the command decision-making process as well as operations on the ground during crucial battles, including the Battle of the Marne in World War I and his incredible victories against a larger and better-equipped Soviet army at the Chir River in World War II. Balck also offers observations on Germany's greatest generals, such as Erich Ludendorff and Heinz Guderian, and shares his thoughts on international relations, domestic politics, and Germany's place in history. Available in English for the first time in an expertly edited and annotated edition, this important book provides essential information about the German military during a critical era in modern history.

Hoffmeister

Related:

The Soldiers' General: Bert Hoffmeister at War

How Hitler Was Defeated


The Canadian Encyclopedia: 

Major General Bertram (Bert) Meryl Hoffmeister, OC, CB, CBE, DSO & Two Bars, ED, Canadian Army officer, businessman (born 15 May 1907 in Vancouver, BC; died 4 December 1999 in Vancouver, BC). During the Second World War, Hoffmeister commanded the Seaforth Highlanders in Sicily, the 2nd Infantry Brigade at Ortona (1943) and the 5th Canadian Armoured Division, which distinguished itself under his courageous leadership in Italy and later in North-West Europe. Military historian Jack Granatstein has referred to Major General Hoffmeister as one of “the best Canadian fighting generals of the [Second world] war.”When the war ended, Hoffmeister resumed his career in the BC forest industry and was made an Officer of the Order of Canada in 1982.

. . .By February 1945, Hoffmeister’s division of 20,000 troops, 450 tanks, 5,600 wheeled vehicles and 320 carriers had sailed from the port of Leghorn, Italy to Marseilles, France and made their way north to join the First Canadian Army in the liberation of the western Netherlands, including the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterham and The Hague, as well as the liberation of Arnhem and Apeldoorn.

By early September 1944, Canadian and Allied forces had already defeated the Germans allowing for the liberation of southern parts of the Netherlands and providing Allied ships access to the vital port of Antwerp, Belgium. By the close of the war in May 1945, the First Canadian Army had liberated all of the Netherlands and provided food and medical aid to the starving population.

An excerpt from, "Forgotten Fights: The Canadian Black Watch at Verrières Ridge, July 1944" by David O'Keefe, National WWII Museum, June 8, 2020:

July 25 marks the 76th anniversary of the breakout by General Omar Bradley’s First US Army in Operation “Cobra,” which is the fulcrum of the Normandy narrative following the spectacular success of the landings on June 6. Lost in the commemoration of service and sacrifice on July 25 is the bloody Canadian-led clash on the eastern flank of the bridgehead—known as Operation Spring—that unfolded in concert with the American push and proved vital to that monumental victory.

Since the D-Day landings, American, British, and Canadian forces had been locked in a deathmatch with the Germans in the bocage country, battling tooth and nail to gain much needed elbow room in the crowded bridgehead. Having recovered quicker than expected from their initial shock, the German defenders had managed to rope off the bridgehead by early July, and as a result, a near stalemate developed. With success measured by feet and yards in an attritional struggle reminiscent of the charnel house battles of the First World War, the Western Allied effort paled compared to that of the Soviet Red Army juggernaut rampaging across Eastern Europe, churning up hundreds of miles at a clip, crushing German divisions and stealing world headlines.

Politically, the lack of decisive action and a corresponding dramatic victory weighed heavily on Allied command plagued by the backbeat of a Presidential election year in the US and increasing war weariness in Great Britain. As one Canadian Brigadier quipped, “the whip was out” to force a decision in Normandy, and General Eisenhower, under immense pressure, pushed 21st Army Group commander General Bernard Law Montgomery (Monty) to act more decisively. Dissatisfied with Montgomery’s current plan to hold with General Miles Dempsey’s Second British Army at Caen to permit Bradley’s Army to bash in the door at St. Lo, Ike ordered a two-fisted offensive to begin immediately. The results were Operations “Cobra” for the Americans and “Goodwood,” with its Canadian subsidiary “Atlantic,” for the Anglo-Canadian forces.

Goodwood, launched on July 18, ended abruptly just two days later despite promising success in its initial stages. Ultimately, the much-ballyhooed Goodwood failed when Dempsey’s armoured forces slammed headlong into the German-controlled Verrières-Bourguebus feature that sat roughly five miles south of Caen. This embryonic line, which by the second week in July formed the main German defensive hinge in Normandy, held firm, inflicted grievous losses and robbed the most elusive of all elements for success—momentum—from the British breakout bid.

However, amongst the misery came one bright spot; during the Canadian subsidiary operation, a small rupture of the German line appeared at the westernmost end of the feature known at that point simply as Verrières Ridge. An initial attempt by the fledgling 2nd Canadian Corps to exploit the breach failed, but out of this costly interlude, Operation Spring was born.

An excerpt from, "Hoffmeister in his Proving Ground, Sicily, July-August 1943" by Douglas E. Delaney, Canadian Military History 12, 3 (2003):

Hoffmeister realized, or came quickly to realize, the effect of a leader’s personal courage in war. Syd Thomson (who later commanded an infantry battalion under Hoffmeister during the Battle of Ortona) said it best:

During a sticky battle, morale is as important, if not more important than good tactics. On the scale of 1 to 10, morale will go from 4 to 9 just by the appearance of a senior commander in the line when and where the bullets are flying. Bert understood this.

Hoffmeister expected this sort of example from all his officers and showed no mercy for those in whom it was lacking. One officer who cowered during the engagement at Valguarnera -  taking his subordinates with him in hasty retreat – Hoffmeister relieved immediately after the event. That officer may very well have been capable of making good tactical decisions; he had probably done so in training. But this was war – an infantryman’s war; it took more than sound management skills, regimental pride or charisma to make organizations work. It took courage. 

Sections, platoons, companies and battalions were comprised of individual soldiers who were subject to the same fears and apprehensions as any other human beings. Yet soldiers in combat had to face those fears more intensely, and more often. Good commanders, like Hoffmeister, carried soldiers beyond their apprehensions and convinced them that they were all on the “same airplane.”

May 24, 2026

Rommel

 


Wikipedia: 

Rommel was a highly decorated officer in World War I and awarded the Pour le Mérite for his actions on the Italian Front. In 1937, he published his classic book on military tactics, Infantry Attacks, drawing on his experiences in that war. In World War II, he commanded the 7th Panzer Division during the 1940 invasion of France. His leadership of German and Italian forces in the North African campaign established his reputation as one of the ablest tank commanders of the war, and earned him the nickname der Wüstenfuchs, "the Desert Fox". Among his British adversaries he had a reputation for chivalry, and his phrase "war without hate" has been uncritically used to describe the North African campaign.

. . .Rommel was famous in his lifetime, including among adversaries. His tactical prowess and decency in the treatment of Allied prisoners earned him the respect of opponents including Claude Auchinleck, Archibald Wavell, George S. Patton, and Bernard Montgomery.

. . .Nevertheless, there are many officers who admire his methods, like Norman Schwarzkopf who described Rommel as a genius at battles of movement saying "Look at Rommel. Look at North Africa, the Arab-Israeli wars, and all the rest of them. A war in the desert is a war of mobility and lethality. It's not a war where straight lines are drawn in the sand and [you] say, 'I will defend here or die." Ariel Sharon deemed the military model used by Rommel superior that used by Montgomery. His compatriot Moshe Dayan considered Rommel a model and icon. Wesley Clark states that "Rommel's military reputation...has lived on, and still sets the standard for a style of daring, charismatic leadership to which most officers aspire." During later desert wars, Rommel's theories attracted interest from policymakers and military instructors. Chinese military leader Sun Li-jen had the laudatory nickname "Rommel of the East". Certain military historians are sceptical of Rommel as an operational, let alone strategic level commander. They point to Rommel's lack of appreciation for Germany's strategic situation, his misunderstanding of the relative importance of his theatre to German High Command, poor grasp of logistical realities, and, according to Ian Beckett, "penchant for glory hunting". Citino credits Rommel's limitations as an operational level commander as "materially contributing" to the demise of the Axis in Africa, while Addington focuses on the struggle over strategy, whereby Rommel's initial brilliant success resulted in "catastrophic effects" for Germany in Africa. Porch highlights Rommel's "offensive mentality", symptomatic of Wehrmacht commanders as a whole, that tactical and operational victories would lead to strategic success.

. . .Joseph Forbes comments: "The complex, conflict-filled interaction between Rommel and his superiors over logistics, objectives and priorities should not be used to detract from Rommel's reputation as a remarkable military leader", because Rommel was not given powers over logistics, and because if only generals who attain strategic goals are great, such highly regarded commanders as Robert E. Lee, Hannibal, and Charles XII would be excluded. General Siegfried Storbeck of the Bundeswehr, remarks that, Rommel's leadership style and offensive thinking, although carrying risks like losing overview of the situation and creating overlapping authority, have been proved effective, and been analysed and incorporated in the training of officers by "us, our Western allies, the Warsaw Pact, and even the Israel Defense Forces". Maurice Remy defends his strategic decision regarding Malta as, although risky, the only logical choice.

Rommel was among the few Axis commanders targeted for assassination by Allied planners. Two attempts were made, the first was Operation Flipper in North Africa in 1941, and the second was Operation Gaff in Normandy in 1944. Research by Norman Ohler claims Rommel's behaviour was heavily influenced by Pervitin which he took in heavy doses. Ohler refers to him as "the Crystal Fox"—playing off the nickname "Desert Fox".

. . .According to revisionist authors, an assessment of Rommel's role in history has been hampered by views formed for political reasons, creating what historians have called the "Rommel myth". The interpretation considered by some historians to be a myth is the depiction of the Field Marshal as an apolitical, brilliant commander and victim of Nazi Germany who participated in the 20 July plot against Hitler. There are authors who refer to "Rommel Myth" or "Rommel Legend" in a neutral or positive manner, though. The seeds of the myth can be found first in Rommel's drive for success as a young officer in World War I and in his popular 1937 book Infantry Attacks, which was written in a style that diverged from other military literature and became a best-seller.

An excerpt from, "Infantry Attacks" by Erwin Rommel, Greenhill Books, London, 1995, Introduction by Manfred Rommel:

My father wrote Infantry Attacks (Infanterie Greift an) in the first half of the 1930s. It was intended as a textbook for the infantry and in it my father drew on his own experiences as an infantry officer during the First World War. Anyone who reads it will notice that my own future existence was repeatedly and seriously in danger, for my father only survived the battles he was in by sheer luck. Had he not done so, I would not have been born in 1928. My father, incidentally, said once that in order to become a hero one must above all survive. Later on, I found this same thought expressed in the works of Elias Canetti.

From my early childhood, as soon as I began to be awarc of the world around me, I knew my father was a hero, Everybody said so; nobody doubted it. That would not have been possible in any case, as my father had been awarded the highest and very rare Prussian order for valour "Pour le Mérite', in the famous shape of a bluc Maltese cross, and established by Frederick the Great. The French name for the award made many of my compatriots uncasy at a time when most Germans only dealt with their French ncighbours over gunsights. I remember some building labourers who considered me, then aged four, to be the correct fount of knowledge on why my father's medal had such a suspicious French name. Nevertheless, this order was regarded by people at that time with the same respect we would now accord the Nobel Prize. When my parents werc out, I used to take my father's medals out of the drawer, pin them on my chest and look at myself in the mirror: unquestionably a most impressive sight.

At that time my father was living in Goslar, in the Hartz mountains, as commander of a Jagerbataillon (literally: hunter battalion), which during the Napoleonic Wars, had been in the service of the King of England in the conquest of Gibraltar. This battalion consisted mostly of descendants of foresters, who only respected a man if he was a hunter. So my father had no choice but to qualify as a hunter and to adorn his home with horns and antlers of the beasts he had shot. He removed all our ancestors portraits and used the wall space for his trophies. He would even have removed the pictures of my mother and myself and substituted trophies instead, had he not encountered strong opposition from the family.

I have always been extremely fond of my father, because he was a warm-hearted person, because he devoted a great deal of time to me, bccause he even listened to me and declared me to be intelligent, and because he was an inventive and imaginative story-teller of both fact and fiction.

In this book, however, nothing is fiction. Easily though it reads, it is the result of self-criticism. My father was a good mathematician, and as a mathematician he was used to doubting conceptions and vicws. He submitted his own actions-to his critical judgement, and considered that only through self-criticism and continuous evaluation of experiences had he become a good tactician and qualified military leader. So, after the First World War, he devoted a great deal of time to critical study of the operations in which he had been involved and the battles in which he had commanded. He made enquiries of other officcrs and soldicrs and carefully evaluated the information he reccived. With my mother, he even visited, on a motorbike, the part of Italy where he had stayed during the war, taking hundreds of photographs and making sketches. It goes without saying that my father did not indicate his profession on the passport he used for the trip as 'military commander' but as engineer,' in order to avoid any unpleasant memories for the Italians.

During the Second World War, too, my father tried always to record his adventures and experiences on paper as soon as possible in order to find out what could have been done better. His writings were published after the war.

My father was professional soldier. In the German Reich prior to 1933, professional soldicrs were not allowed cither to become involved in politics or to vote. Therefore the soldiers considered themselves as apolitical and thereby not responsible for politics. This principle was a sound one and perfectly acceptable as long as there was democracy in Germany. But after Hitler had become Chancellor of the Reich in 1933 and had reccived a majority of two-thirds of the votes of the German Reichstag, this principle became fatal. In general, it is worth mentioning that all secondary virtues such as bravery, discipline, loyalty and perseverance only have validity so long as they are used in a good causc. When a positive cause becomes negative, these virtues become question- able. The German army had to experience this bitter truth during Hitler's regime. Hitler's attention was drawn to my father when he read Infanterie Greift an. In 1938 he summoned my father and appointed him, in the event of army mobilisation, commander of the Führerhauptquar- ticr, an administrative military post to which my father was little suited. However Hitler respected him as a soldier, and in 1940gave him command of a tank division which played an important role during the German offensive against Anglo-French troops that year. In 1941, my father was appointed German commander in North Africa. He stayed there, with some interruptions, until March 1943, when Hitler, as a result of my father's pessimistic views on the future of the war so far as Germany was concerned, relieved him from his post.

In spring 1944, my father became supreme commander of the German Army Group B in Northern France, Belgium and the Netherlands. After the Normandy landings, it became clearer by the day that the German troops were going to face an annihilating defeat. In this situation my father decided -if necessary on his own responsibility -to surrender in France when the Allied troops broke through. This he judged the appropriate moment taking into account the men under his command. He wanted to avoid, at all costs, the possibility that in the last phase of the catastrophe Germans might shoot Germans in his area of command. My father also had links with the conspirators in Berlin, but did not think they would be able to achieve a revolution or attempt an attack on Hitler himself. On 17 July, 1944, my father was severely wounded in Normandy during an attack by British low-flying aircraft. When Graf Stauffenberg, on 20 July tried to assassinate Hitler, my father was still urconscious. As is well known, Stauffenberg's attempt failed, Hitler set in motion exhaustive investigations amongst the conspirators, and in the process it became known that my father had intended to turn against Hitler. Hitler, therefore, decided to exterminate my father, and this decision was implemented on 14 October, 1944. Two generals, charged by Hitler with this mission, delivered Hitler's 'offer' to our house at Herrlingen near Ulm: that my father should agrec to be poisoned. Provided he agreed, he was assured that the customary measures against his family - removal to a concentration camp - would not be taken. Nor would investigations be made about his staff officers, My father, who was convinced that Hitler would never put him public trial, decided on death. He asked for the favour of ten minutes' on respite to say goodbye to my mother, myself and his staff officer. This he was granted, And so we knew how he had to die. Hitler arranged a state funcral for him, and at Hitler's command the NS-Press celebrated my father once more as a war hero, so that those whom Hitler sent into the senseless battles of the last months of the war, could take him as their inspiration.