An excerpt from, "Hitler’s Decision to Invade the USSR, 1941" a chapter from the book, "Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn" 2014, by Bonny Lin, David Gompert, and Hans Binnendijk:
Hitler took steps early in his tenure to direct his gaze to the east. He broke a longstanding armaments-cooperation agreement with Russia in 1933. Three years later he joined the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. Hitler and Stalin fought by proxy during the 1936 Spanish Civil War. Stalin resisted Hitler’s efforts to gain control over Czechoslovakia and sought alliances to protect Russia against Hitler’s unabashed vision.
By 1939, Hitler and his Schutzstaffel (SS) began an effort to convert his vision into a brutal plan, called Generalplan Ost, which called for the racial reorganization of Eastern Europe, including Russia. It prescribed ethnic cleansing and genocide of Slavs in order to make room for Germany’s population, which would grow, as German women were encouraged to have large families. Hitler’s motivation combined aspiration for Germany with fear and contempt for Slavs, Jews, and Communists. As Stephen Fritz concludes, this plan “anticipated and was directly linked to the so-called Final Solution.”But the time was not yet ripe for an attack on Russia. First, Hitler would take advantage of a shared interest with Stalin in coveted Polish territory, which had been controlled by their predecessors for more than a century but was relinquished as a result of World War I. In August of 1939, Hitler and Stalin set aside their ideological and nationalist differences to find common purpose. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact contained a five-year mutual nonaggression pact and a secret protocol dividing the territory between them, notably Poland. Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, and the Soviet Union invaded Poland weeks later.
The new proximity between Germany and the Soviet Union further exacerbated existing tensions. In November 1939, Stalin invaded Finland and met unexpectedly fierce resistance, creating the impression of Soviet military weakness. In April 1940, Soviet military bases were created in the three Baltic states, and Stalin occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina in June. Stalin was reinforcing his strategic position against Germany, and Hitler knew it.
Meanwhile, Hitler was forced to deal with his Western Front. France and Britain declared war in response to Hitler’s invasion of Poland. Hitler reacted in 1940 by invading Norway, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and finally France. Blitzkrieg skirted the Maginot Line, and France capitulated on June 22. Most of the British army escaped through Dunkirk.
The Battle of Britain lasted from July 10 to October 31, 1940. Given British naval superiority, German admirals told Hitler that they needed absolute air superiority before they could launch an amphibious invasion. British and German aircraft were numerically fairly even, but Britain had several advantages, including radar and operating over its home territory. As of September, the Luftwaffe’s focus turned from air control to bombing British cities. The Royal Air Force survived, and Hitler lost the Battle of Britain.
Hitler asked his staff if the attacks on Britain and plans for invasion should be called off, believing that Britain would eventually accept an armistice. Having failed in his effort to conquer Britain, Hitler turned back to his primary target in the east. He told his staff that the British were continuing to fight because they hoped Russia would be drawn in on their side. Ergo, if Russia were defeated, Britain would capitulate. Now he said: “The road to London ran through Moscow."
Synopsis of "Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn" (Rand Corporation, 2014):
The history of wars caused by misjudgments, from Napoleon's invasion of Russia to America's invasion of Iraq, reveals that leaders relied on cognitive models, or simplified representations of their worlds, that were seriously at odds with objective reality. Blinders, Blunders, and Wars analyzes eight historical examples of strategic blunders regarding war and peace and four examples of decisions that turned out well, and then applies those lessons to the current Sino-American case. Leaders' egos, intuitions, unwarranted self-confidence, and aversion to information that contradicted their views prevented them from correcting their models. Yet advisors and bureaucracies can be inadequate safeguards and can, out of fawning or fear, reinforce leaders' flawed thinking.
War between China and the United States is more likely to occur by blunder than from rational premeditation. Yet flawed Chinese and American cognitive models of one another are creating strategic distrust, which could increase the danger of misjudgment by either or both, the likelihood of crises, and the possibility of war. Although these American and Chinese leaders have unprecedented access to information, there is no guarantee they will use it well when faced with choices concerning war and peace. They can learn from Blinders, Blunders, and Wars.
