An excerpt from, "Napoleon On War" Edited By Bruno Colson, Translated By Gregory Elliott, Oxford University Press, 2015, Pg. 153 - 155:
Napoleon knew the value of secrecy, cunning, and deception. Some believe that he had a natural bent for them; that his temperament impelled him to Machiavellian schemes. Clausewitz reckoned that 'it seems not unjust that the term "strategy" should be derived "cunning" and that, for all the real and apparent changes that war has undergone since the days of ancient Greece, this term still indicates its essential nature'. Yet he was scarcely under any illusions about the role of cunning in strategy. It can only be resorted to on the isolated occasions that present themselves. What a general needs above all is an accurate, incisive view.
Napoleon often used cunning in campaigns, but, as Clausewitz says, especially when he commanded a comparatively small force---that is, when he was only a general. At the very start of his first Italian campaign, Massena was to attract the Italians to Voltri to cut them off from the Piedmontese:
Do nothing that could create the impression that you want to evacuate this position, which must still be held for some time since we are occupying it. Keep your eyes open on Montenotte and always do what an enemy does when he wants to advance and believes himself stronger. Surveillance and boasting as required---all the methods common to war are invariably good and succeed.Before the island of Malta, General Bonaparte gave this order in 1798:
In all cases, you must order that some sappers or labourers, whom you will take from the Marmont brigade and who will be paid, straight away move some earth so as to make the enemy believe that we are establishing batteries, by constructing a bit of a rampart with earth and others with barrels filled with earth. This will disturb the enemy and will have the double advantage of making him use his powder, if he is stupid enough to fire, and speeding up the negotiations that are under way.Before El-Arich in Egypt, the commanding general had mannequins made to create the impression that there were sentries. During this campaign, he also employed a practice already adopted in Italy:
In Egypt, Napoleon had agreed with all the heads of corps that, in the orders of the day, the actual quantity of provision of foodstuffs, weapons, clothing would be exaggerated by a third [ . . .] In the accounts of the Italian campaigns in 1796 and 1797, and since, the same methods have been used to convey an exaggerated idea of French strength.This practice was an important aspect of Napoleonic strategy:
[ . . .] the art of war consists in exaggerating one's own strength and diminishing the enemy's.
It would be a strange mistake to assume that all the conscriptions decreed have actually been carried out. It was a ruse used to impress foreigners; it was a means of exercising power.
During his final campaigns, the Emperor's forces were decidedly inferior in numbers to those of the allies. It was necessary to compensate for this by exploiting his reputation. Thus, on several occasions he ordered that people should be led to believe he was present:
A good ruse would be to have salvos fired in celebration of the victory won over the other army. A ceremonial review should also be staged as if I was there and troops be made to exclaim: Vine l'Empereur.
[ . . .] let [Macdonald] make all the arrangements required to get the troops to believe that I am present; in cases where he is in the presence of the enemy, to have them exclaim Vine l'Empereur! [ . . .] and to spread rumours of my arrival among the soldiers and inhabitants tomorrow.
Napoleon was in agreement with Clausewitz and 'the sword of Renaud'----doubtless a copy error for 'Roland'----is equivalent to 'direct action' in the following reflection, which relativizes the importance of cunning in strategy:
The Austrians are very good at spreading false rumours, at creating false opinions among the inhabitants; they are great masters in sowing alarm in an army's rear. But if you unsheathe the sword of Renaud, the spell will be broken immediately.Nevertheless, the skill of the Austrians in spreading false rumours fooled the French, who were often unduly credulous, more than once, as is acknowledged by a bulletin of the Grande Armee in 1805:
A column of 4,000 Austrian infantry and a regiment of cuirassiers crossed our posts, which allowed them to pass because of a false rumour of suspension of hostilities that had been spread in our army. In the ease with which this was done one recognizes the character of the Frenchman, who, brave in the melee, is often unreasonably generous outside combat.
