Some Thoughts On Adolf

The movement that exists in certain spheres online to rehabilitate Adolf Hitler's image is deeply troublesome because it is ahistorical. It overlooks the fact that Hitler was a socialist occultist who didn't believe in individual liberties and worshipped the state as God. 

Hitler was a green fascist long before the globalist environmentalists took up the mantle later in the 20th century. His racism was clear not only in his statements about Jews, but Poles, Russians, Armenians, basically anyone who wasn't German. 

Now, was he a defender of Germany and Western Europe at large? Undoubtedly. Nobody can deny that. He was a soldier who faced the bullets in the trenches like a madman. He risked his life for his country. He had many positive and life-affirming qualities. Upon seizing power he rebuilt the German economy within a short span of time, transformed many industries, and mentally liberated a nation that was falsely scapegoated for the First World War. 

The impetus for that war, as it has been documented by amateur historians and independent researchers, originated in London, not Berlin. The English King wanted to stop an ascendant Germany with war instead of diplomacy. He successfully convinced Russia, France, and later America to join his anti-German crusade. 

After the disastrous war for the fate of Europe the loser was unfairly painted with a dark brush, singled out like a black sheep of the European family, and punished mercilessly throughout the 20s. Hitler came on the scene at the end of that decade as a rescuer of a nation choking on economic pain. He provided answers. He promised to make Germany great again and actually came through on that promise.

But he was also guilty of mass propaganda, false flag terrorism, and acts of aggression. He hypnotized an entire nation with simple words. His party attracted torturers, thugs, and murderers, as well as philosophers, architects, and poets, both the worst and the best of German society. He took a nation off its knees only to take it to war and blaze a new path of destruction. 

But was he wholly responsible for the Second World War? No.

The Second World War was born the moment the Tsar was overthrown in 1917 in an act that was facilitated by German leaders at the time, Jewish American bankers, and their Masonic co-conspirators in London. So it's wrong to blame Hitler for WW2 when the Soviets introduced themselves on the historical scene as a menace to world peace and Europe long before Hitler took power. 

We must remember that while Stalin was robbing trains and terrorizing civilians Hitler was in the trenches taking bullets for his country. One began as a common thief without a country or a king, the other as a foot soldier fighting for king and country. Neither were good men, but let's be honest about their levels of villainy. The Soviets were king killers and nation destroyers. They were not heroes or liberators. And it turned out in the end that neither was Hitler.

Syria Post-Assad: A Success Story Or A Disaster In The Making?

 

I'm not an expert on Syria's politics or Syrian society. I've read only one book about the country and its modern colonial creation after WWI. So take this analysis with a grain of salt.

I think the worst thing to happen to modern Syria, worse than the brutal war that was waged on it for over a decade, was Assad choosing to run to hide in Moscow. That decision validated his enemies and send the entire reign of his family down the drain. He should have stayed in Damascus and committed suicide once his army and allies abandoned him. 

But he never was a forceful or charismatic leader. He was cosplaying the role of one, much like his successor. It was his father who secured the throne, and there must have been a multitude of political factors why the Assad dynasty ruled for so long. An objective observer can't point to brute force as the only reason. 

The Assad regime was a cunning fox, playing sides against each other to remain in power. It was an Alawite-led state that suppressed the Sunni majority, which, if left unchecked, can grow powerful and ambitious enough to overrun all the different minorities of Syria. 

From what I've gathered the Sunnis of Syria and Iraq don't make for good rulers because of their racism and their religion. Just the other day, on the one year anniversary of Assad's ouster, the largely Sunni crowds in the streets of Damascus were chanting for the murder of the Alawites. It's clear these people haven't learned anything from their recent violent history. They are still bloodthirsty and self-righteous. 

And they mean what they chant. It's not just empty bravado.

The Sunnis of that region, when secure in political power, take no prisoners. We saw what happened when ISIS, backed by Western, Turkish, Saudi, and Israeli intelligence agencies, got its hands on advanced weapons. They attracted a global cult following, and started massacring everybody who didn't share their religious creed. 

Now, a leader and technician from that movement, has fully seized the Syrian state, put on a new Western-provided uniform, and is cosplsaying as an enlightened ruler with simple and pragmatic ambitions.

It's a political fantasy, a wish. The reality is he's the same person who directed suicide bombing missions and waged war on Syrian civilians in towns and cities that showed resistance to his terrorist group. 

Those in Syria who remember his past criminal acts aren't fooled by his words.

Sending Ukraine On A Suicide Mission: NATO As The Ultimate Terrorist Alliance

For the sake of world peace and European security NATO must be defeated and humiliated in Ukraine. Its pathetic retreat in Afghanistan did not injure its pride or change its ambitions. It remains a monster that feeds on war.

And that's morally and politically acceptable if it was actually waging war in Ukraine with its own soldiers and armies. But it is not. It is hiding behind a captive population. 

Ukraine is a hostage.

What we're witnessing currently is not a war between Ukraine and Russia or a proxy war between NATO and Russia but the deliberate sacrifice of an entire nation. This is human sacrifice, not war, with unwilling combatants being dragged from their homes throughout Ukrainian towns to the front lines. 

In a real war of national resistance against a foreign occupier such barbaric tactics would not be necessary. Men would go willing to fight. This is not the case in Ukraine because the criminal government that was installed by Washingdon more than a decade ago does not speak for the Ukrainian nation. 

All they do is lie. It is led by corrupt thieves, gangsters, fascists, and drug addicts. They all should be rounded up and executed, starting with Zelensky. 

Napoleon On Facing Russia In The Winter

 

An excerpt from, "Napoleon On War" Edited By Bruno Colson, Translated By Gregory Elliott, Oxford University Press, 2015, Pg. 372 - 375:

At Vitebsk on 13 August 1812, Napoleon justified his invasion plan for Russia in a lengthy monologue reported by Baron Fain. The text takes up several ideas referred to in previous books: the drive and impatience of French troops, the political dimension of strategy, the ineluctability of risk-taking in war, seeking battle so as to avoid stalemate:

. . .Our troops are happily heading forward. They enjoy wars of invasion. But a stationary, prolonged defensive campaign is not in the French genius. To halt behind rivers, to remain there stationed in shacks, to manoeuvre every day in order only to be in the same place after eight months of privation and woes, is that how we are used to waging war?

The lines of defence presented to you today by the Dnieper and Danube are merely illusory. Once winter arrives, you will see them filled with ice and effaced under snow.

Winter does not only threaten us with its cold weather; it also threatens us with diplomatic intrigues that might brew up behind our backs. Shall we allow these allies whom we have just won over, and who are still utterly astonished to no longer be fighting us and glory in following us, time to reflect on the oddity of their new position?

And why halt here for eight months, when twenty days would suffice for us to achieve our objective? Let us anticipate winter and reflections! We must strike promptly, on pain of jeopardizing everything. We must be in Moscow in a month, on pain of never entering it!

In war, fortune counts for half in everything. If one always awaited a complete conjuction of favourable circumstances, one would never finish anything.

In short, my plan of campaign is a battle and my whole policy is success.

All of Napoleon is in this quotation, which is like a conclusion. In the final chapter of Von Kriege, Clausewitz devotes several paragraphs to the 1812 campaign in Russia. For Napoleon, it was the first to fail. The excessive character of the undertaking, in terms of the forces committed and the theatre of operations itself, represented the culminating point of the Napoleonic Wars. For Clausewitz, the Emperor's failure did not stem from the fact that he advanced too rapidly or too far, as is generally believed. In essence, he could not have done differently. His campaign failed because the government of Russia remained firm and its people unshakeable. Napoleon was mistaken in his calculations. He did not assess his opponent correctly. 

. . .Napoleon had a proclamation written for the emancipation of the serfs, but kept it confidential as a form of possible intimidation. He did not want to cross certain boundaries and confided his desire to negotiate to Caulaincourt:

Hitherto, apart from the fact that Alexander burns his towns and cities so that we cannot live in them, we have fought a fairly good war. No disagreeable publications, no insults. He is wrong not to come to an agreement now that we have had a scrap. We would soon be in agreement and remain good friends.

To fight a 'fairly good war': Napoleon was still sufficiently marked by the age of Enlightenment not to desire a full unleashing of force. As we saw in Book I, he quipped that he regretted not having resorted to it, but he did not open Pandora's Box. Such restraint was not due solely to the still relatively rudimentary state of technologies of destruction.

On several occasions, Napoleon sketched an analysis of Russian power, which frightened him:

Russia is a frightening power that seems to conquer Europe. With its Cossacks, Tartars, and Poles, it can put thousands of cavalry on horse everywhere. There would not be enough horses in Europe to withstand it. In the past, three powers opposed its expansion: Sweden, but it has not been able to do anything since the loss of Finland; Poland, but it now forms part of the Russian Empire; and the Turks, who are null.

Las Cases reports further considerations on Russia and, beyond it, on the future of Europe:

The Emperor passed on to what he called the admirable situation of Russia against the rest of Europe, to the immensity of its mass in the event of invasion. He depicted this power situated under the pole, sustained by eternal ice which, as and when necessary, rendered it inaccessible. It could be attacked, he said, only for three or four months, or one-quarter of the year, whereas it had the whole year---twelve months---against us. It offered attackers nothing but the harsh conditions, suffering, and privations of a desert land, a dead or inert nature, whereas its peoples launched themselves with zest towards the delight of our south.

In addition to these physical features, said the Emperor, joined to its sizeable, sedentary, brave, tough, devoted, passive population were enormous tribes, whose normal state was deprivation and vagabondage. 'One cannot but tremble at the idea of such a mass, which can be attacked neither by the coasts nor in the rear; which floods over us with impunity, inundating everything if it triumphs or withdrawing into the ice, the heart of desolation, death, which have become its reserves if it is defeated; and all this with the ability to reemerge immediately if required. Is this not the hydra's head, the Antaeus of the fable, who could be finished off only by grasping him bodily and suffocating him in one's arms? But where is Hercules to be found? It only fell to us to dare to pretend to the role and, it must be admitted, our attempts were clumsy.'

Napoleon On Death In Battle

An excerpt from, "Napoleon On War" Edited By Bruno Colson, Translated By Gregory Elliott, Oxford University Press, 2015, Pg. 59 - 62:

One of the worst moral dilemmas faced by Napoleon in war involved the plague victims in Jaffa in March 1799. A situation of this kind can be met with in any era of history and puts one in mind of certain American Westerns and war films. Given the impossibility of transporting the soldiers stricken by the plague, and in order to avoid them falling into Turkish hands and suffering appalling tortures, General Bonaparte probably had poison administered to them, which resulted in a painless death, as Bertrand recounts:

It must be remembered that it was a question of not leaving them prisoners in the hands of the Turks, who in their remaining twelve hours of life would have cut them into pieces, applied molten lead to them . . .etc. Had it been my wife or son, I would have behaved similarly if I could not take them with me, because the first principle of charity is to do to others what we would have done to ourselves [ . . .]. On this one must consult not civilians, but soldiers. Ask the 53rd. They would speak with one voice.

The British 53rd infantry regiment was responsible at the time for guarding the prisoner of Saint Helena. The appeal to the opinion of soldiers of another nationality testifies once more to Napoleon's proximity to all members of the profession. His lack of hesitation over taking the decision at Jaffa will always be open to discussion. He did not concern himself with the prevailing morality, or the teaching of the Church, when adopting the course of action that he sincerely believed to be least painful for his men.

Death in battle is an outcome that can be anticipated by any soldier. It is not part of our intention to study Napoleon's view on the subject in depth, but there was unquestionably a certain fatalism about him. As we have already seen in some quotations, and as we shall see later, while his way of waging war did not spare men, he sincerely believed rapid operations invariably avoided greater suffering. Frequently confronted with the death of men close to him, he sometimes gave vent to his compassion. We know the deep impression made on him by the spectacle of the battlefield of Eylau after the terrible clash of 8 February 1807. He had these words to say:

A father who loses his children savours no charm in the victory. When the heart speaks, even glory has no more illusions.

He wrote to Josephine:

My friend, I am still at Eylau. The ground is littered with the dead and wounded. This is not the best part of war; one suffers and the soul is oppressed at the sight of so many victims.

On 26 June 1813, at Dresden, Napoleon showed a different side of himself to Prince Metternich. If we are to believe the Austrian diplomat's memoirs, the Emperor, in a moment of anger it is true, shouted:

I have grown up on the battlefield and a man like me hardly concerns himself about the lives of a million men.

On Saint Helena, he gave it to be understood that he had ended up being accustomed to frequenting death:

It is quite true that the idea of God is a very natural idea. At all times, among all nations, people have had it. But one dies so quickly; in war I have seen so many people die immediately and pass so rapidly from the state of life to that of death that it has made me familiar with death.

On another occasion, when speaking of a book by the naturalist Buffon, he explained:

What he says about death is good. It is not to be feared, because five-sixths [of men] die without suffering and those who seem to be in agony suffer little, for those who have recovered have no memory of it. So the machinery is disrupted and pain is not felt as acutely as people believe, because it leaves no traces. Charles XII, it is said, carried his hand to his sword when a cannon ball or bullet struck him dead. So the pain was not such as to deprive him of the desire to defend himself; it was not extreme.

We owe to Napoleon some of the most beautiful letters of condolence that have ever been written:

Your nephew Elliott has been killed on the battlefield of Arcola. This young man had familiarized himself with weaponry; he marched at the head of the columns several times; he would have made an admirable officer one day. He died with glory in face of the enemy; he did not suffer for one moment. What reasonable man would not envy such a death? Who, amid the vicissitudes of existence, would not want to leave a world that is often despicable thus? Who among us has not regretted a hundred times not being shielded thus from the impact of calumny, envy, and all the odious passions that seem well-nigh exclusively to govern the conduct of men?

Your husband was killed by cannon fire, while fighting alongside it. Without suffering, he died the gentlest death, the one most envied by soldiers. 

I feel your pain acutely. The moment that separates us from the object we love is terrible; it isolates us from the earth; it causes the body to experience the convulsions of agony. The faculties of the soul are destroyed; it retains its links with the universe only through a nightmare that changes everything. In this situation we feel that, if nothing compelled us to go on living, it would be much better to die. But when, after these initial thoughts, we press our children to our heart, tears and tender feelings revive nature and we live for our children. Yes, Madame, you will cry with them; you will raise them in childhood and cultivate their youth; you will speak to them of their father, of your grief, of the loss they have suffered, of that suffered by the Republic. Having attached your soul to the world through filial love and maternal love, appreciate the friendship and keen interest I shall always take in my friend's wife as something. Be persuaded that he is one of the men, few in number, who warrant being the hope of grief, because they feel the sorrows of the soul acutely.

This piece of eloquence, remarkable for its humanity, envinces a profound sensitivity. Rarely have such appreciate words found to console a loss. Napoleon understood the pain of others. On several occasions, he is known to have cried after a battle. He also made a major contribution to developing a rhetoric of military heroism and glorious death. If the bloodbaths of the First World War have doubtless destroyed the credibility of this kind of discourse in Western Europe for ever, we must not be anachronistic. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, life was so hard and life-expectancy so short that death in battle could seem like an outcome which, if not enviable, was at least acceptable.