October 14, 2024

Some History On Jewish Opposition To Zionism, Plus Nuclear Power In The Messianic Age



The American empire, the state of Israel, and the Islamic Republic are destined for the history books. The only question that remains is the number of victims they pile up before they exit the pages of time. 

Since 9/11 that number has been steadily climbing. In many ways, the illegal invasion of Afghanistan and the ongoing destruction of Gaza are linked. 

The Zionists used the might of the West to destroy their enemies, and thereby weakened the West, especially America. 

Islam never posed any challenge to the West. The only Islamic nation with Nukes is the basketcase known as Pakistan, an artificially constructed garrison state that can't survive without foreign aid.

Israel presents the greatest nuclear threat in the world today, far greater than North Korea, whose military ambitions are checked by China for security reasons. 

In the Israeli drama, there isn't a bigger, more rational and responsible brother like China. American security is not harmed from Israel's total devastation of Palestine so it doesn't need to check Israel in any way. It has the luxury of geography, which China does not have with North Korea. And there’s also the moral aspect. American leaders have lost their moral compass. If Israel were to drop a nuke on Gaza, Lebanon, or Iran tomorrow America would congratulate it for achieving a successful operation. 

Related: 

Why The Bomb Was Dropped And How It Changed The Presidency

Obama Got Rid of The Imaginary Iranian Bomb, But Continues To Ignore The Very Real Israeli Bomb And Wahhabi Bomb

The USrahelli Nuclear Winter Is Coming To The Middle East

The Evils of An Ethno-Supremacist Totalitarian Fascist State; Why The World Should Forgive Israelis Who Are The Most Propagandized People In Human History




An excerpt from, "The Forgotten History of the Jewish, Anti-Zionist Left" By Sarah Lazare, Jacobin, July 21, 2020:

Sarah Lazare spoke with Benjamin Balthaser, an associate professor of multiethnic literature at Indiana University at South Bend. His recent article, “When Anti-Zionism Was Jewish: Jewish Racial Subjectivity and the Anti-Imperialist Literary Left from the Great Depression to the Cold War,” examines the erased history of anti-Zionism among the Jewish, working-class left in the 1930s and ’40s. Balthaser is the author of a book of poems about the old Jewish left called Dedication, and an academic monograph titled Anti-Imperialist Modernism. He is working on a book about Jewish Marxists, socialist thought, and anti-Zionism in the twentieth century.

He spoke with Lazare about the colonial origins of modern Zionism, and the Jewish left’s quarrel with it, on the grounds that it is a form of right-wing nationalism, is fundamentally opposed to working-class internationalism, and is a form of imperialism. According to Balthaser, this political tradition undermines the claim that Zionism reflects the will of all Jewish people, and offers signposts for the present day. “For Jews in the United States who are trying to think about their relationship not only to Palestine, but also their own place in the world as an historically persecuted ethno-cultural diasporic minority, we have to think of whose side we are on, and which global forces we want to align with,” he says. “If we do not want to side with the executioners of the far-right, with colonialism, and with racism, there is a Jewish cultural resource for us to draw on — a political resource to draw on.”

Sarah Lazare: Can you please explain what the ideology of Zionism is? Who developed it and when?

Benjamin Balthaser: A couple of things need to be disentangled. First of all, there is a long Jewish history that predates the ideology of Zionism that looks at Jerusalem, the ancient kingdom of Judea, as a site of cultural, religious, and, you can say, messianic longing. If you know Jewish liturgy, there are references that go back thousands of years to the land of Zion, to Jerusalem, the old kingdom that the Romans destroyed.

There have been attempts throughout Jewish history, disastrously, to “return” to the land of Palestine, most famously, Sabbatai Zevi in the seventeenth century. But for the most part, through much of Jewish history, “Israel” was understood as a kind of cultural and messianic longing, but there was no desire to actually physically move there, outside of small religious communities in Jerusalem and, of course, the small number of Jews who continued to live in Palestine under the Ottoman Empire — about 5 percent of the population.

Contemporary Zionism, particularly political Zionism, does draw on that large reservoir of cultural longing and religious text to legitimize itself, and that’s where the confusion comes.

Modern Zionism arose in the late nineteenth century as a European nationalist movement. And I think that’s the way to understand it. It was one of these many European nationalist movements of oppressed minorities that attempted to construct out of the diverse cultures of Western and Eastern Europe ethnically homogenous nation-states. And there were many Jewish nationalisms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, of which Zionism was only one.

There was the Jewish Bund, which was a left-wing socialist movement that rose to prominence in the early twentieth century that articulated a deterritorialized nationalism in Eastern Europe. They felt their place was Eastern Europe, their land was Eastern Europe, their language was Yiddish. And they wanted to struggle for freedom in Europe where they actually lived. And they felt that their struggle for liberation was against oppressive capitalist governments in Europe. Had the Holocaust not wiped out the Bund and other Jewish socialists in Eastern Europe, we might be talking about Jewish nationalism in a very different context now.

Of course, there were Soviet experiments, probably most famous in Birobidzhan, but also one very brief one in Ukraine, to create Jewish autonomous zones within territories that Jews lived, or elsewhere within the Soviet Union, rooted in the Yiddish idea of doykait, diasporic hereness, and Yiddish language and culture.

Zionism was one of these cultural nationalist movements. What made it different was that it grafted itself onto British colonialism, a relationship made explicit with the Balfour Declaration in 1917, and actually tried to create a country out of a British colony — Mandate Palestine — and use British colonialism as a way to help establish itself in the Middle East. The Balfour Declaration was essentially a way to use the British Empire for its own ends. On some level, you could say Zionism is a toxic mixture of European nationalism and British imperialism grafted onto a cultural reservoir of Jewish tropes and mythologies that come from Jewish liturgy and culture.

Lazare: One of the underpinnings of modern Zionism is that it’s an ideology that represents the will of all Jews. But in your paper, you argue that criticism of Zionism was actually quite common on the Jewish left in the 1930s and ’40s, and that this history has been largely erased. Can you talk about what these criticisms were and who was making them?

Balthaser: The funny part about the United States, and I would say this is mostly true for Europe, is that before the end of World War II, and even a little after, most Jews disparaged Zionists. And it didn’t matter if you were a communist, it didn’t matter if you were a Reform Jew, Zionism was not popular. There were a lot of different reasons for American Jews to not like Zionism before the 1940s.

There’s the liberal critique of Zionism most famously articulated by Elmer Berger and the American Council for Judaism. The anxiety among these folks was that Zionism would basically be a kind of dual loyalty, that it would open Jews up to the claim that they’re not real Americans, and that it would actually frustrate their attempts to assimilate into mainstream American culture.

Elmer Berger also forwarded the idea that Jews are not a culture or a people, but simply a religion, and therefore have nothing in common with one another outside of the religious faith. This, I would argue, is an assimilationist idea that comes out of the 1920s and ’30s, and tries to resemble a Protestant notion of “communities of faith.”

But for the Jewish left — the communist, socialist, Trotskyist, and Marxist left — their critique of Zionism came from two quarters: a critique of nationalism and a critique of colonialism. They understood Zionism as a right-wing nationalism and, in that sense, bourgeois. They saw it as in line with other forms of nationalism — an attempt to align the working class with the interests of the bourgeoisie.

There was at the time a well-known takedown of Vladimir Jabotinsky in the New Masses in 1935, in which Marxist critic Robert Gessner calls Jabotinsky a little Hitler on the Red Sea. Gessner calls the Zionists Nazis and the Left in general saw Jewish nationalism as a right-wing formation trying to create a unified, militaristic culture that aligns working-class Jewish interests with the interests of the Jewish bourgeoisie.

So that’s one critique of Zionism. The other critique of Zionism, which I think is more contemporary to the Left today, is that Zionism is a form of imperialism. If you look at the pamphlets and magazines and speeches that are given on the Jewish left in the 1930s and ’40s, they saw that Zionists were aligning themselves with British imperialism.

They also were very aware of the fact that the Middle East was colonized, first by the Ottomans and then by the British. They saw the Palestinian struggle for liberation as part of a global anti-imperialist movement.

Of course, Jewish communists saw themselves not as citizens of a nation-state, but as part of the global proletariat: part of the global working class, part of the global revolution. And so for them to think about their homeland as this small strip of land in the Mediterranean — regardless of any cultural affinity to Jerusalem — would just be against everything they believe.

As the Holocaust began in earnest in the 1940s, and Jews were fleeing Europe in any way they possibly could, some members of the Communist Party advocated that Jews should be allowed to go to Palestine if you’re fleeing annihilation and Palestine is the only place you can go that is natural.

But that doesn’t mean you can create a nation-state there. You need to get along with the people who live there as best as you possibly can. There was a communist party of Palestine that did advocate for Jewish and Palestinian collaboration to oust the British and create a binational state — which, for a host of reasons, including the segregated nature of Jewish settlement, proved harder in practice than in theory.

In any case, the Jewish left in the 1930s and ’40s understood, critically, that the only way Zionism would be able to emerge in Palestine was through a colonial project and through the expulsion of the indigenous Palestinians from the land. In a speech by Earl Browder, chairman of the Communist Party, in Manhattan’s Hippodrome, he declares that a Jewish state can only be formed through the expulsion of a quarter-million Palestinians, which attendees thought was very shocking at the time, but it actually ended up being a dramatic undercount.

Lazare: You wrote in your recent journal article, “Perhaps the single most pervasive narrative about Zionism, even among scholars and writers who acknowledge its marginal status before the war, is that the Holocaust changed Jewish opinion and convinced Jews of its necessity.” You identify some major holes in this narrative. Can you explain what they are?

Balthaser: I would alter that a bit to say I’m really talking about the communist and Marxist left in this context. I grew up within a left-wing family where opinion was definitely divided on the question of Zionism — yet, nonetheless, there was a pervasive idea that the Holocaust changed opinion universally, and everyone fell in line as soon as the details of the Holocaust were revealed, Zionist and anti-Zionist alike.

It’s undeniably correct to say that without the Holocaust there probably would have been no Israel, if just for the single fact that there was a massive influx of Jewish refugees after the war who would have undoubtedly stayed in Europe otherwise. Without that influx of Jews who could fight the 1948 war and populate Israel just after, it’s doubtful an independent state of Israel could have succeeded.

However, one thing I found most surprising going through the Jewish left press in the 1940s — publications of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party, the Communist Party, and writings by Hannah Arendt — is that even after the scope of the Holocaust was widely understood, their official position was still anti-Zionist.

They may have called for Jews to be allowed to resettle in the lands from which they were expelled or massacred, with full rights and full citizenship, be allowed to immigrate to the United States, or even be allowed to emigrate to Palestine if there was nowhere else to go (as was often the case). But they were still wholly against partition and the establishment of a Jewish-only state.

What is important to understand about that moment was that Zionism was a political choice — not only by Western imperial powers, but also by Jewish leadership. They could have fought more strenuously for Jewish immigration to the United States. And a lot of the Zionist leaders actually fought against immigration to the United States.

There were a number of stories reported in the Jewish communist press about how Zionists collaborated with the British and Americans to force Jews to go to Mandate Palestine, when they would have rather gone to the United States, or England. There’s a famous quote by Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary, who said the only reason the United States sent Jews to Palestine was “because they do not want too many more of them in New York.” And the Zionists agreed with this.

While this may seem like ancient history, it is important because it disrupts the common sense surrounding Israel’s formation. “Yes, maybe there could have been peace between Jews and Palestinians, but the Holocaust made all of that impossible.” And I would say that this debate after 1945 shows that there was a long moment in which there were other possibilities, and another future could have happened.

Ironically, perhaps, the Soviet Union did more than any other single force to change the minds of the Jewish Marxist left in the late 1940s about Israel. Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Union’s ambassador to the United Nations, came out in 1947 and backed partition in the United Nations after declaring the Western world did nothing to stop the Holocaust, and suddenly there’s this about-face. All these Jewish left-wing publications that were denouncing Zionism, literally the next day, were embracing partition and the formation of the nation-state of Israel.

You have to understand, for a lot of Jewish communists and even socialists, the Soviet Union was the promised land — not Zionism. This was the place where they had, according to the propaganda, eradicated antisemisitm.

The Russian Empire was the most antisemitic place throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, before the rise of Nazism. Many of the Jewish Communist Party members were from Eastern Europe, or their families were, and they had very vivid memories of Russia as the crucible of antisemitism. For them, the Russian Revolution was a rupture in history, a chance to start over. And, of course, this is after World War II, when the Soviet Union had just defeated the Nazis.

For the Soviet Union to embrace Zionism really sent a shockwave through the left-wing Jewish world. The Soviet Union changed its policy a decade or so later, openly embracing anti-Zionism by the 1960s. But for this brief pivotal moment, the Soviet Union firmly came down in favor of partition, and that seems to be what really changed the Jewish left.

Without this kind of legitimation, I think we are all starting to see the Jewish left such as it exists return back in an important way to the positions that it had originally held, which is that Zionism is a right-wing nationalism, and that it is also racist and colonialist. We are seeing the Jewish left return to its first principles.

An excerpt from, "Jews and Nuclear Weapons" Harvard Divinity School, 2018:

The NPT is a global agreement signed by nearly every nation to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.  Since its ratification in 1970 only four countries have never signed, and three have atomic weapons today: India, Pakistan, and the Jewish state of Israel.  Israel, home to nearly half of the world’s Jews, was created in 1948 following the Holocaust.  Since then, Israel’s neighbors have declared war on the state several times for complex reasons that include Israel’s occupation of Palestine and anti-Semitism.  Thus, haunted by memories of the Holocaust and surrounded by hostile neighbors, Israel refused to sign the NPT and began their own project to build an atomic bomb.  With help from France, they did so in the 1960s.  Israel has always refused to confirm or deny the existence of their stockpile, but it is widely known that by 2014 they had at least 80 nuclear warheads. 

Today, while the vast majority of Jews agree that using nuclear weapons should be a last resort, many Jews, especially in Israel, have religiously justified possessing them.  Surrounded by hostile neighbors, Israeli Jews often believe that the survival of the Jewish state is dependent upon having the bombs as deterrents.  They cite Jewish law in the book of Exodus which prohibits Jews from allowing oneself to be killed, arguing that eliminating atomic bombs would be tantamount to committing suicide as their antagonistic neighbors would take advantage of their weakness.  With strong social memories of the Holocaust, they believe that the fear of nuclear retaliation will ensure that a genocide of the Jews will never happen again.   In fact, Israeli rabbi Pinchas Peli has argued that, “if anyone has the right to possess nuclear weapons… Israel is the country that should irrefutably have that right.  It is, after all, the only state that is threatened openly and constantly with total destruction.”   However, other Jews have argued that while Israel should keep their nuclear arsenal, it is still clearly immoral, so Jews must “choose the lesser evil,” between having the bombs and being destroyed.   In short, many Israeli Jews believe that if they were pacifists, “they would have long since been dead.” 

In fact, Israel’s stockpile itself is often described in religious terms.  For example, in the Six Days War in 1967, a secret plan was drawn up—though not executed—to detonate an atom bomb in Egypt if Israel seemed poised to lose the war.  It was named “Operation Samson” after the character in the Biblical book of Judges who pushed over the support columns of a temple, killing himself and his enemies.  Similarly, an Israeli system to intercept incoming warheads is called “David’s Sling” after the weapon King David used to kill Goliath in the book of Samuel. 

An excerpt from, "Occultation in Perpetuum: Shi'ite Eschatology and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis" (PDF) By Dr. Ze'ev Maghen, Bar-Ilan University, May 1, 2007, Pg. 25 - 30:

A few paragraphs must now be devoted to the "Hojjatiyyeh" society, another by-word which - together with its cognate "Mahdaviyyeh" - has been tossed around endlessly by pundits, politicians and even professors ever since the accession of Ahmadinejad. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for instance, regularly makes much of this organization in speeches and interviews - despite his abject dearth of knowledge on the subject- comparing it, inter alia, to the Branch Davidian cult of David Koresh: 

I was looking for an analogy to try to explain to Americans what it is that is so dangerous about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. You remember those crazy people in Waco, Texas? ... the Hojattiyyeh is that kind of cult. It's the cult of the Mahdi, a holy man that disappeared a thousand years ago. And the president of Iran believes that be's supposed to - that he was put here on Earth to bring this holy man back by inaugurating a great religious war between the true Muslim believers and the infidels. And millions will die in this Apocalypse, and the Muslims will go to heaven .... Ahmadinejad, the president of Iran, is first trying to develop nuclear weapons and then going about his mad fantasy of global conflict.

There are more fundamental mistakes in this passage than we have time to enumerate, but one of them, at least, should be addressed. Far from being composed of radical messianists who seek to usher in the· apocalyptic millenium, the Anjoman-e-Hojjatiyyeh, founded in the mid-twentieth century by Shaykh Mafunud-e-Halabr, was and remains an ultra-conservative association devoted to the suppression of a particular latter-day messianic movement that claims that the Hidden Imam is already here: the Baha'i. It advocates, in perfectly traditional, orthodox Twelver fashion, the pious and passive practice of"awaiting" the Savior, but specifically discourages and condemns as heretical any active effort to hasten his arrival. The organization's name does indeed derive from one of the many titles of the Hidden Imam - .al-Hujja, "the Proof' - but this title was deliberately chosen from among all the others in order to signify the Hojjatiyyeh's staunch opposition to any involvment in the political affairs of this world ("[the appelation hujja] emphasizes the religious and spiritual aspects of [the imam's] function, as opposed to [designations like] al-Qa 'im or Safzib a/-'Amr which convey his role as the ideal ruler of Islam who will restore Islamic justice to the world"). Indeed, so apolitical, non-radical and anti-messianic are the ideas of this group that it viewed Khomeini's doctrine of the Guardianship of the Jurist (velayat-e-faqih), together with the revolution it helped engender, as essentially ghuluww phenomena, a position which led to their official disbandment in 1984. The reason that the Hojjatiyyeh are associated with the slogan mahdi biyii, mahdi biyii! (Savior, come, Savior, come!) is because the members of this organization chanted this slogan immediately after the revolution specifically in order to undermine the popular feeling that the lmam was already present in the person of Khomeini. It's actual import was: "the Savior has yet to come, the Savior has yet to come!', Netanyahu and the hundreds of other speakers, journalists and analysts who facilely bandy about the name Hojjatiyyeh and exploit it to depict the new Iranian government as living on the faultline between this world and the next could not have gotten it more wrong. 

. . .Messianism is a mushy term and a nebulous phenomenon. Even if the Final Redeemer and eschatological scenario of a given religion has been effectively defused as is the case in Twelver Shiism- there will always be individuals and groups that place a greater emphasis on such aspects than does the mainstream. In Shi'ism, if those individuals or groups go too far they have been and will be suppressed. But Ahmadinejad has not gone too far in that sense. His "messianic" acts and statements are as normative as dropping a message for the mahdi down the well of the Jamkaran mosque. Defanged messianism can and does co-exist quite comfortably with conservative religious tradition (the Jamkaran mosque is located in Qom). All pious Shi'ites pray for the return of the Hidden Imam just as all pious Christians pray for the return of Jesus and all pious Jews for the arrival of the mashiah. That does not mean that they run their lives or their polities based on this vague and distant wish. 

This paper has argued that messianism or mahdism is not a potent force within Shi'ism, and therefore not a genuine factor in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. This does not mean that American and international pressure on Iran to halt its nuclear program should be ceased; it means that it should be increased sevenfold. Were the Iranian leadership truly convinced that the Eschaton was around the comer, no amount of sanctions or threats of military action would be effective. Since they are not in the least bit convinced of this, such measures - if pursued with resolution, . wisdom and consistency (unlike the current state of affairs)- are likely to produce significant effects. Mass martyrdom might be acceptable to certain elements in the regime, but slow economic strangulation leading to intolerable levels of popular discontent are anther story. As long as we persist in buying our own hype about the dangerously irrational and apocalyptically oriented Islamic Republic, we will continue to fear the Iranians more than we should, and this fear will paralyze us. 

Other-worldly Messianism does not drive present-day Iranian policy. Nevertheless, when Ahmadinejad - or Khamene'i, or Mesbap-e-Yazdi, or Jannati, or Daviidi, or others - talk about the Hidden Imam and publicly pray for his return, this is more than mere lip service or the expression of some undefined longing connected to the far distant future. There is another, more metaphorical and less metaphysical level upon which mahdism operates in today's Islamic Republic. It consists of a very this-worldly set of aspirations involving Iran's burgeoning power and Islam's ideological and political (and eventually military) ascendency. The statements and speeches made by Iran's leaders in connection with the Hidden Imam's advent are almost invariably accompanied by their own translations and interpretations, which taken together boil down to the strong sense of mission and momentum afforded them by the original revolution and by recent international developments. They believe that Iran is going to raise up the humiliated head of the the Islamic world and preside over the process whereby its superior spiritual and moral (and political) system undermines- with or without the help of the sword (but most likely with) - the decaying edifice of the debauched and enervated West. And just as the original set of Shi'ite clerical achievements detailed throughout this essay and climaxing in the revolution of 1979 required the suppression of ecstatic, other-worldly messianism, so the this-worldly ''messianism" evinced by an ambitious Iran today requires the avoidance of another type of apocalyptic eventuality: nuclear conflict. For Iran to launch a nuclear weapon on any target would mean the end of her precious ''messianic" dream of spreading Islam throughout the world under the aegis of Twelver Shi'ism; it would mean the end of Iran. 

The implications for American and European policy of this reassessment of Shi'ite Iranian messianism are rife, but not on the nuclear level: there, as I have stated, other extremely compelling reasons exist for denying Iran the bomb, even though messianism is not one of them. The most important implications of the this-worldly Iranian-Islamist messianism I have just described are, to my mind, found in an area usually ignored by Western thinkers and policy makers. The greatest danger to the West posed by Iran and Islamism in the long run is neither a nuclear nor even a military danger (though these dangers exist and must not be ignored) but a cultural-ideological danger. Iran and its far flung fundamentalist allies perceive the West as weak, disunified and decadent - and they are right. Monistic Islam becomes more sure of itself every day; pluralistic, post-modern "'America and Europe (and Israel) become less sure of themselves every day. It is this trend which must be reversed if liberal civilization is to have a chance at survival. Preventing nuclear proliferation is a piece of cake compared to that task. 

October 12, 2024

Edward Chancellor - The Price of Time: The Real Story of Interest


Wikipedia:

John "Edward" Horner Chancellor (born December 1962), is a British financial historian, finance journalist, and former hedge fund investment strategist and a former investment banker. In 2016, the Financial Analysts Journal called him "one of the great financial writers of our era", and in 2022, Fortune called him "one of the greatest financial historians alive". Chancellor is noted for his prescient warnings of the last three major economic bubbles in his published works: Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation (1999, the dot-com bubble), Crunch-Time for Credit? (2005, the credit bubble), and The Price of Time: The Real Story of Interest (2022, the everything bubble).

. . .In 2022, he published The Price of Time: The Real Story of Interest, which criticized the orthodox central banking policy of continually lowering interest rates, and using perpetual quantitative easing, to generate economic growth via asset price inflation. A policy that Chancellor predicted had resulted in an everything bubble in asset prices, extreme wealth inequality (particularly between the generations), and that would end in very high levels of price inflation.

Martin Wolf in the Financial Times described the book as "a polemic against everything [Ben] Bernanke stands for" when reviewing it alongside former Fed chair Ben Bernanke's own 2022 book, 21st Century Monetary Policy. Martin Vander Weyer praised the book describing it as a more engaging read on the subject area than Thomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Emma Duncan in the Sunday Times praised the book and said Chancellor had a "gift for timing", as his two earlier books had forewarned of bubbles in speculation – the dot-com bubble, and the credit bubble – that eventually burst. Finance author Felix Martin called the book a "timely warning" of central bank folly, and given the prescient nature of Chancellor's previous two books, said that as well as buying the book, investors should "sell all your stocks". In August 2022, the book was added to the list for the Financial Times Business Book of the Year Award for 2022.

The journalist John Tierney, in his comments introducing Chancellor at the 2023 Hayek Lecture, said the author possessed "an extremely rare gift" in the timing of his writings. Regarding The Price of Time, for which Chancellor received the Hayek Award, Tierney added, "His book is remarkable not only for its prescience, but also for its erudition and its flair".

Video Title: Edward Chancellor. The Price of Time: The Real Story of Interest. Source: LoM. Date Published: November 20, 2022.

October 10, 2024

The War Industry's Endless Appetite For Enemies, And "The Evils of Revolutionary Violence"

 


An excerpt from, "US arms dealers witness 'record profits' from Israel's year-long genocide in Gaza, war on Lebanon" The Cradle, October 10, 2024:

US arms manufacturers have outperformed major stock indexes this year in a rally fueled by Israel's year-long genocide of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the expansion of its war against Lebanon.

Stock funds with holdings in the US aerospace and defense industry – including companies like Boeing, Lockheed Martin, RTX, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, and L3Harris – saw their profits soar past expectations this year, outperforming the S&P 500 index.

. . .According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2019 and 2023, Israel accounted for 2.1 percent of all global arms imports. During the same period, the US accounted for 69 percent of Israel's arms imports, while Germany accounted for 30 percent.

As Washington retains its long-standing hold as the world's largest arms dealer – controlling 42 percent of the global arms market – the country has also significantly boosted its military spending to assist Israel, blowing through at least $23 billion in one year.
An excerpt from, "CHRISTIANITY AND THE WAR-SYSTEM OF THE NATIONS. No. III" Advocate of Peace (1847-1884), New Series, Vol. 6, No. 4 (APRIL, 1875), pp. 20-22:
Let us not be understood to deny, that wars, even as other gigantic evils, have not in some instances, been overruled for the advancement of Christ's kingdom. What would have be come of our world had not Infinite Wisdom in many cases, been able to bring good out of evil? But, we cannot too strongly reprobate that pestilent delusion, which even in our time possesses the minds of some good people, that war is the means for promoting Christian civilization. As well say, darkness promotes light, hatred promotes love, barbarism promotes refinement. Because in some instances, wars have been followed by eras of increased light and progress, persons jump to the conclusion that war is the cause of the increased light and progress.

This pernicious mistake is well exposed by Dr. Harris, the able professor of theology at New Haven. In his recent work upon Christ's Kingdom, he says, "The progress of Christ's kingdom is not to be promoted by force. Institutions founded on force shall be overthrown by force. Christ's kingdom is founded on truth and love. Force moves in a different sphere from these. An epoch is not necessarily by violence. When an apple tree bursts into blossom and covers itself with sweetness and beauty, that is an epoch in its growth. When this beauty passes away and the fruit sets, that is an epoch. But these epochs are peaceful, because all the organic forces in the tree are subject to its life and in harmony with each other, and the crises of its growth come peacefully as the natural expression of the life. So in the kingdom of God, if the spiritual life is full and unobstructed, its epochs come quietly as the blooming and fruiting of a tree. The old falls away because its work is done, and peacefully gives place to the new. The change is not less, the epoch not less glorious, because it is peaceful. Revolutions are not essential nor desirable in the great epochs of human progress. . . . The violence incident to an epoch in the growth of Christ's kingdom is an evil. Because our own government was founded in a revolution, we are in danger of associating a revolution with glory, of thinking that the overturn of what has been established is in itself progress to something better. But the American Revolution scarcely was a revolution in the proper sense of the term. It perpetuated the principles and, with little change, the form of government to which the colonies had been accustomed. It only separated them from a distant nation. It only accelerated an epoch which was coming as the inevitable result of growth, only shaking the tree to hasten the fall of the ripened fruit. The benefits accruing are not the result of the revolution, but come in spite of the evils of revolutionary violence, because the change effected was the natural result of healthy growth. The immense majority of revolutions attempted by violence have been failures, and have hindered rather than helped the progress of society."

Pages would be required for a full statement of the ways in which the war-system impedes the progress of Christianity. It is not denied that some warriors, both officers and soldiers, are devoted disciples of the Prince of' Peace, but they are such in spite of the natural tendency of their employment, and of the war-system. Its natural tendency is to demoralize, to harden and to brutalize, to make savages rather than Christians of the millions who are devoted to it as a profession. And then its effects upon society at large ! It consumes the wealth needed for the development of the resources of the nations ; for establishing, endowing and sustaining institutions of education and religion ; for supplying the apparatus and appliances to promote the arts and sciences ; for sustaining great philanthropic and Christian enterprises. It withdraws a mighty host of men in the very prime and vigor of their powers from the pursuits of useful industry, and from those callings and professions that have for their end to enlighten the ignorant, to reclaim the vicious, to save the lost, to elevate man, and ennoble the State.

Says John Foster: "The stream of sentiment, of strong interest, of ardent feeling, in other words, the passion, the affection, which during the last half century has flowed into that river of blood, think if it had instead flowed through all the channels and streams of peaceful benevolence!" 

Nor is the influence of the war-system against Christianity of a merely negative character. It was Edmund Burke who said, "War reverses all the rules of morality." Much more, then, it reverses all the rules and precepts of Christianity. The Sabbath and the sanctuary and all Christian institutions---upon these foundations of Christianity, the war-system looks with utter contempt, and it sweeps them away as if worthless dust.

Says Seeley, "Political feelings and religious feelings are equally outraged by war. It tramples on the sense of right and wrong and on the precepts of Christianity as mercilessly as it crushes the physical happiness of individuals." 

We add, this is not all. It sows broadcast the seeds of a thick crop of vices and crimes. Profanity, intemperance, licentiousness are among its uniform results. It deranges, confuses, disorders all the legitimate occupations of the people ; it piles up taxes ; it converts business into gambling and speculation ; destroys the sacredness of human life. Dishonesty, corruption, fraud in the community and legislative halls, bloated wealth and wide-spread poverty are the harvest which it yields. 

In a word, it breaks up the foundations of society, overturns and destroys what it has required the thought, the money and the labor of a multitude of Christians for long generations, it may be, to build and produce. Such have been the consequences of every great war that history records, even of those wars, the reason or end of which has been the most worthy.

October 7, 2024

70 Years of Foreign Interference In Lebanon

Beirut, the host of spies. 

Lebanon has been called the playground of foreign powers. It is not a real country to begin with. It's just another artificial state in the Middle East. Its elections have always been bought. It has never had national sovereignty.

When lawlessness, disunity, and disorder prevails in a land, the results you get are civil wars, invasions, drug trafficking, corruption, weapons smuggling, political assassinations, rise of terrorist militias, and all manners of foreign espionage. 

Regional and international interference in this part of the Middle East stretches a lot longer than 70 years, but it was in the 1950s when outside powers, particularly the United States, intervened in Lebanese politics to the detriment of its long-term security and cohesion as a young republic.



An excerpt from, "Register of the Wilbur Eveland papers" Hoover Institution Library and Archives, 2012:

Although not technically a CIA agent at this point in his career, Eveland was sent on a mission to Syria for the agency in 1955, where he was tasked with working with conservative groups in the country. Upon returning from this assignment, Eveland was recruited into the CIA, where he worked closely with Allen Dulles. From 1955 to 1959, Eveland was assigned to the American embassies in Damascus, Syria, and Beirut, Lebanon, as a CIA agent using Department of State cover. During this time, Eveland completed several missions in Syria, some involving coup attempts, including a mission to deliver half a million pounds to Syrian politician Mikhail Ilyan that Eveland completed shortly before the beginning of the Suez Crisis. Eveland participated in joint United States and United Kingdom planning sessions and also served as the contact person for Camille Chamoun, President of Lebanon.

From 1959 to 1961, Eveland was on CIA assignment to Rome, Italy, under cover as a Vinnell Corporation engineering company executive in charge of petroleum related construction, maintenance, and training projects in the Middle East and Africa. In 1962, he resigned from the CIA to become the vice president of Vinnell, although he was retained as an unpaid consultant to the CIA to maintain his security clearance. In the 1970s, Eveland worked as a consultant for various companies in the petroleum industry.

Eveland decided to write a book documenting American policy in the Middle East while watching the port of Beirut burn at the start of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975. The contract for Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East was signed in 1977. 

An excerpt from, "Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East" By Wilbur Crane Eveland, 1980, Forbidden Bookshelf, 'Chapter Fifteen: The Ticking Clock 1956':

At our urging, Chamoun reminded me, he had associated Lebanon with the Eisenhower Doctrine at a time when neutrality in the East-West struggle for influence in tlhe Middle East would have been an easier, and possibly wiser, course. Sustaining Lebanon's pro-American position had not been easy: most of Lebanon's politicians and religious leaders believed that their country's interests would be better served by their remaining aloof from inter-Arab and global conflicts. The results of the recent parliamentary elections had introduced another issue with which both Chamoun and America would have to contend. Accusations that the voting had been rigged to permit the president to seek a second six-year term of office were being made by the country's Egyptian-backed Moslems and Palestinians, supported by Radio Cairo's calls for Chamoun to resign immediately. 

. . .Chamoun's parting words contained a challenge: "Why don't you fly back to Washington and urge that your government's decision be formulated and brought here by McClintock when he presents his credentials?" This, I knew, meant arguing against the concept that a presidential appointment endowed its recipient with great wisdom. I decided, however, to try it.

Arriving in Washington at the height of the Christmas season was not a propitious action unless one had been called back to deal with an international crisis, and tiny Lebanon wasn't expected ever to qualify in that category. To begin with, I was told by Assistant Secretary Rountree's office that Ambassador McClintock had been thoroughly briefed. He was away for the holidays, and then he'd sail for Beirut to arrive in early January 1958. When I asked State's Lebanon-desk officer what our position on the Lebanese presidency might be, he reminded me that the election wouldn't be held until July and that we'd have plenty of time to decide before then. Allen Dulles was tied up and couldn't see me, but Norman Paul and I found an audience with Richard Helms, who'd now added Kim Roosevelt's responsibilities to his own. Helms admitted frankly that he knew little about the Middle East, but complaining that he'd been saddled with a legacy of the area's aborted operations, he was eager to hear about the CIA's funding of the Lebanese parliamentary elections. As I ticked off the problems we'd had with the embassy, Helms asked that I summarize my position in a memorandum and include my recommendations concerning future U.S. policy toward Lebanon.

Now without a family in Washington, I spent Christmas Eve typing up a fourteen-page report on what I'd learned about Lebanon and my views about how the United States should deal with the coming presidential election. The issue as I described it was not just what we should do about Lebanon, but how what we did there would affect our position in other states of the area. Nor should the U.S. position be based on Chamoun's views alone.

That a Maronite Catholic would be the next president was not in question, for even the most antigovernment politicians had a stake in preserving this provision of the National Covenant, under which all faiths and sects benefited. The question, rather, was whether any Maronite president could sustain Lebanon's pro-American orientation without support from two key coreligionists-the commander of the armed forces and the Maronite patriarch. Chamoun appeared to have the backing of General Fuad Shehab, whose military forces were predominantly Catholic, but Shehab was not noted for being forceful and he'd also once enjoyed the status of heading Lebanon's government during a presidential crisis. Chamoun was at odds with the patriarch, who'd broken with the president over the Eisenhower Doctrine, holding that the church could not survive a conflict with Arab nationalism. Although presumably pro-American- he'd been a pastor in New Bedford and Los Angeles and, for a time, an American citizen-the patriarch saw Lebanon as a mediator between the Arabs and the West.

Also important were the leaders of the government's opposition, I wrote, whom I feared Washington tended to think of as entirely Moslem, forgetting that what we'd done in the elections had alienated many Christians who'd previously sympathized with America's Middle East policies. By highlighting the cleavages within Lebanon that our own actions had produced, I hoped to discourage thinking that support of a Chamoun bid for reelection would either unify Lebanon or enhance that country's position with its neighbors.

I'd also learned that we still counted on Lebanon, with Chamoun's permission, for planning to implement WAPPEN and SIPONY to change the governments in Syria and Egypt. Worse, there was still a WAKEFUL program, meaning that in addition to scheming with friendly intelligence services, we were still thinking about yet another unilateral CIA crack at Syria. I dealt with this in my report by drawing attention to the probability that we'd not be able to use Lebanon for such purposes under a successor to Chamoun. 

An excerpt from, "The Secret History of Hezbollah" By Tony Badran, Washington Examiner, November 25, 2013:

Thirty years ago last month, Hezbollah blew up the barracks of the U.S Marines and French paratroopers stationed at the Beirut airport, killing 241 U.S. servicemen and 58 Frenchmen. It wasn’t Hezbollah’s first terrorist operation, but this attack, the most memorable in Lebanon’s vicious and chaotic 15-year-long civil war, marked the Party of God’s entry onto the world stage. 

Three decades later, thanks to the efforts of Israeli Hezbollah expert Shimon Shapira, we now know that one of the men responsible for the attack was an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander named Hossein Dehghan — the man Iranian president Hassan Rouhani recently tapped to be his defense minister. In other words, Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic of Iran have been joined at the hip from the very beginning, even before the 1979 Iranian revolution.

Of course, that’s not the standard account of Hezbollah, the historical narrative jointly constructed and largely agreed upon by Middle East experts, journalists, some Western and Arab intelligence officials, and even Hezbollah figures themselves. This account holds that Hezbollah was founded in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley in 1982 to fight, or “resist,” the Israeli invasion of that year. On this reading, the belief — held by the organization’s many critics, targets, and enemies — that Hezbollah is little more than an IRGC battalion on the eastern Mediterranean is simply part of a U.S.-Israeli disinformation campaign meant to smear a national resistance movement fighting for the liberation of Lebanese lands. Sure, Hezbollah was founded with some help from Iranian officials, and still receives financial assistance from Tehran, but the organization is strictly a Lebanese affair. It was engendered by Israel’s 1982 invasion and subsequent occupation of Lebanon. The occupation, as one author sympathetic to the group put it, is Hezbollah’s “raison d’ĂȘtre.”  

Even former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak contends that it was the Israeli occupation that gave birth to Hezbollah. “It was our stay [in Lebanon] that established [Hezbollah],” Israel’s most decorated soldier said in 2010. “Hezbollah got stronger not as a result of our exit from Lebanon but as a result of our stay in Lebanon.” Perhaps Barak was simply keen to defend his decision to withdraw Israeli troops from Lebanon in 2000, for his account is simply not true.

The big bang theory of Hezbollah that puts the Israeli occupation at the alpha point is based not in fact but in legend — it’s an Israel-centric myth that makes the Jewish state Hezbollah’s motivation and prime mover. In reality, the story of Hezbollah’s origins is a story about Iran, featuring the anti-shah revolutionaries active in Lebanon in the 1970s, years before Israel’s intervention. Thus, to uncover Hezbollah’s roots, it is necessary to mine the accounts of Iranian cadres operating in Lebanon a decade before Israel invaded. 

There we find that, contrary to the common wisdom, Hezbollah didn’t arise as a resistance movement to the Israeli occupation. Rather, it was born from the struggle between Iranian revolutionary factions opposed to the shah. Lebanon was a critical front for this rivalry between Hezbollah’s Iranian progenitors and their domestic adversaries. Accordingly, an accurate understanding of this history gives us not only the true story of Hezbollah’s beginnings, but also an insight into the origins of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. Those early internal conflicts and impulses, played out in Lebanon as well as Iran, also provide a roadmap for reading the nature of the current regime in Tehran, its motivations and concerns, its strategies and gambits as it moves toward acquiring a nuclear weapon and challenging the American order in the Middle East. 

For Iranian revolutionary activists, Lebanon in the early to mid 1970s was valuable ground, not because it bordered Israel, but because it was a free zone in which to pursue their anti-shah activity. Though the Lebanese government maintained relations with Iran, the weakness of the state presented opportunities unavailable elsewhere in the Middle East. The autonomy of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the most significant military outfit in Lebanon after it was pushed out of Jordan in 1970, and the military training camps it ran in Lebanon afforded the anti-shah opposition — often traveling with fake Palestinian identity papers — many benefits. There they could operate and organize freely, acquire military training and weapons, make contacts with other revolutionary organizations, form alliances, and establish networks of support for their fight against the Pahlavi regime. 

Another attraction for the Iranians was Lebanon’s large Shiite population, especially the influential Iranian-born cleric Musa al-Sadr, who proved helpful to many of the Iranian oppositionists. Both Sadr’s network and the PLO’s would continue to prove critical even after the Iranian revolution, in the ensuing power struggle between Iran’s revolutionary factions. 

Of the several Iranian groups operating in Lebanon in the 1970s, two main factions are of note. One comprised figures from the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI), such as Mostafa Chamran, who served as defense minister after the fall of the shah. In Lebanon, Chamran and the LMI worked closely with Sadr, whom LMI leaders knew from his student days in Tehran, and who was the uncle of one of the group’s leaders in exile. 

Sadr also relied on the Palestinians for training his newly formed Amal militia. His concern wasn’t fighting Israel but rather protecting his and the Shiite community’s interests from other Lebanese factions with the onset of the Lebanese civil war. He and Chamran were ambivalent about the Palestinians, and in 1976, when Sadr aligned with Syrian president Hafez al-Assad and supported Syria’s entry into Lebanon, the divide only widened. The PLO and its allies on the Lebanese left opposed Syria and sharply criticized Sadr. Moreover, Palestinian attacks on Israel from south Lebanon put Shiite villagers in the face of Israeli retaliation, a danger that worried both Sadr and Chamran. It wasn’t long, then, before Amal came into conflict with the same Palestinian factions that had trained Sadr’s men. 

In contrast, the other main faction of Iranian revolutionaries operating in Lebanon maintained close relations with the PLO and mistrusted Sadr and the LMI. This faction was made up of devotees of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and after the Iranian revolution became part of the Islamic Republic party. Many of them also became top commanders in the IRGC and the Office of Liberation Movements (OLM), charged with establishing contacts with and supporting revolutionary movements abroad. In effect, the OLM was the precursor of the Quds Force, the overseas operations arm of the IRGC. It was set up under the supervision of Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, a close associate of Khomeini and his heir apparent, and was headed by his son, Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Montazeri. 

Others associated with the Khomeinist faction working in Lebanon included Jalaleddin Farsi, a close associate of Montazeri who was the party’s candidate in Iran’s first presidential election after the revolution, and Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Mohtashami, a student of Khomeini who later became ambassador to Syria and would play a critical role in the emergence of Hezbollah. Another important figure in this camp who played a key role in forming Hezbollah was Mohammad Saleh Hosseini, a founding member of the IRGC. 

An excerpt from, "Syria and Lebanon: a fateful entanglement" By David A. Korn, Royal Institute of International Affairs, September 1986:

For most Syrians, an independent Lebanon has always seemed an anomaly, a product of foreign interference. This attitude, of course, overlooks Lebanon's distinctive characteristics, but there is an element of truth in it. From the sixteenth century onwards, France saw in the protection and the prosperity of the Maronites of Mount Lebanon a special calling for itself. Tsarist Russia made itself the patron of the Syrian Eastern Orthodox community, and Britain took the Druze under its wing. When France took over its Syrian protectorate at the close of the Second World War, it promptly set about the business of creating a state for the Maronites. The mere confines of the autonomous Christian mutassarifiye of Mount Lebanon, set up by the Ottomans at France's insistence in 1860, were deemed too exiguous to support a viable modern entity. The French resolved this problem by stretching the lines on the map to embrace areas to the north and south inhabited mainly by Sunni and Shiite Moslems and Druze. Within the expanded borders, Christians predominated by a narrow margin, 52 to 48 per cent, according to a census taken in 1932.

France's action was not applauded in Syria. The King- Crane Commission, sent to Syria and Palestine in 1920 by President Wilson, reported that a majority of Syrians opposed separate status for Lebanon and at the most would accept autonomy for Maronite Mount Lebanon within a Syrian state. When it became independent in 1943, Syria would gladly have undone the handiwork of French colonialism on its western border. The French gave the Syrians no chance to do so; they proclaimed Lebanon's independence a few hours ahead of Syria's. In the years that immediately followed, Damascus continued to talk about 'reincorporating Lebanon. But govern ments there were too weak and too entangled in Syria's own domestic turmoil, and they changed too frequently, to do more than talk. Lebanon, meanwhile, gained recognition as an independent state and status in the international community; it joined the United Nations and became a founding and active member of the Arab League. Syria gradually came to terms with Lebanon's separate existence, though it never formally accepted its new neighbour. It never established diplomatic relations with Lebanon; Syrian leaders preferred to deal face to face with the Lebanese rather than through the traditional intermediary of embassies. And on the rationale that Syrians and Lebanese were 'one people', the Syrian state never required visas or other special documentation for Lebanese entering its territory.

An excerpt from, "The Ongoing Battle for Beirut: Old Dynamics and New Trends" (PDF) By Benedetta Berti, Institute For National Security Studies, December 2011, Pg. 41 - 46:

Iranian involvement in Lebanon is at once unexceptional and unique: unexceptional because in the context of domestic Lebanese politics, the direct involvement of external actors – regional as well as global – is hardly a surprising or unusual phenomenon. On the contrary, by mapping some of the most prominent partnerships between Lebanese and foreign players, this study demonstrates that Lebanon has historically been a regional playground for third parties to both intervene and compete for power and influence. Under these parameters, the Islamic Republic’s interest in the Lebanese political arena is hardly exceptional, and in fact matches the role and interests of the other major regional powers. 

At the same time, Iranian involvement in Lebanon differs from that of other foreign powers in at least one important way: no other state can claim an equally solid and longstanding alliance, both ideologically and politically, with a local political actor. The relationship between Iran and Hizbollah is in this sense unique. While all major political parties in Lebanon depend to a certain degree on other regional and global actors for sponsorship and funding, none has an external relationship as pervasive or pivotal as Hizbollah’s with Iran. Similarly, no state has invested as much in local Lebanese actors as Iran has invested in the Lebanese-Shiite militia. As discussed in the previous chapter, Syria’s alliances with local actors have been characterized by an opportunistic approach; the country has shifted its support according to changing domestic and geopolitical considerations. In contrast, other alliances, such as the alliance between the Christian Maronites and Israel during the civil war, or between Saudi Arabia and the Sunni community, have not developed as much as the Iranian-Hizbollah partnership.

This solid and special relationship, which began in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, builds upon the preexisting ties between the Shiite community of Lebanon and its Iranian counterpart. Such ties date as far back as the sixteenth century when the new rulers of Iran, the Safavid dynasty, adopted Shiism as the new official religion of their empire, moving away from the traditional version of Sunni Islam previously practiced in the area corresponding to modern day Iran. To this end, the new Safavid rulers brought Shiite clerics to their new empire to help them educate their subjects on Shiite Islam, turning to Lebanon (the Jamal Abel area), where a Shiite community was already established since the eleventh century. In the following centuries, contact between the Iranian and Lebanese Shiite communities continued, although the Lebanese community always maintained its own separate identity and over the years established stronger bonds with Iraq than with Persian-speaking Iran. Nonetheless, the common Shiite identity and the historic ties between the Lebanese and Iranian Shiites constituted the basis for the modern partnership between Iran and Hizbollah. At the same time, such a relationship, as well as Iranian interests in Lebanon, far exceeds the links created by the shared Shiite identity.

First, the connection between the Lebanese Hizbollah and Iran is ideological, and the Lebanese organization’s belief system is strongly grounded in the teachings of the Iranian Revolution. Moreover, the Iranian interest in supporting the creation of Hizbollah reflected the Islamic Republic’s early drive to export Khomeini’s revolution outside its own borders. To achieve this political and ideological objective, Iran looked very closely at Lebanon, where the fact that the Shiite community was the largest religious minority within the country, combined with the structural weakness of the Lebanese state and the vacuum of power created by the civil war, offered a particularly fertile environment for attempting to export the revolution. Indeed, within Iran, support for Hizbollah has been used to show the regime’s “purity” and adherence to the teaching of the Islamic Revolution, which suits the more conservative hardliners within the regime.

In addition, since its initial establishment Hizbollah has become strategically important for Iran, and Iranian involvement in Lebanon has focused on protecting and promoting the Lebanese-Shiite organization. 

Hizbollah has served as a poster child for the Iranian Revolution, while Tehran has used the group’s resistance against Israel as a means to earn political leverage within the region, as well as to foster concepts like “panIslamic unity” to gain popularity in the largely Arab and Sunni region. As such, in a regional perspective, Iranian interest in Lebanon through its alliance with Hizbollah is aimed at increasing the country’s leverage when it comes to shaping regional dynamics, especially the evolution of the ArabIsraeli conflict. 

Finally, Tehran’s assessment of Lebanon as a proxy theater of confrontation with Israel reflects another main reason behind the Islamic Republic’s involvement in Lebanon. Along with ideological and political considerations, Iran, through Hizbollah, looks at Lebanon from a security perspective. Accordingly, Hizbollah can act not only to increase Iranian leverage with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but it can also serve for power projection and deterrence against the country’s enemies. 

Thus even if Iranian ties with Lebanon are not as established or extensive as those between Lebanon and Syria, Iranian interest in Lebanon, and especially in its local strategic partner, Hizbollah, is nonetheless solidly grounded in ideology, politics, and security. As such, since its creation in 1979 the Islamic Republic has taken an active role in the Lebanese political arena.

Iran in Lebanon before Hizbollah (1943-1982) 

A common perception especially among Western analysts portrays Hizbollah as a “foreign actor” created ad hoc by the Islamic Republic to advance its objectives and impose them upon Lebanon. In fact, however, the process that led to the rise of Hizbollah should be viewed as a confluence of the ideals of the Iranian Revolution with the culmination of an internal Lebanese process of communal and religious politicization of the Lebanese Shiite population. 

Since the establishment of modern day Lebanon, the Lebanese Shiites, historically concentrated in the peripheral areas of southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, have been second class citizens, politically underrepresented, marginalized, economically underdeveloped, and lacking a communal ethos. It was only when these conditions slowly began to change in the 1950s that the community gradually began to join together to assert its socio-political rights. This process was triggered by the introduction of wide economic and social reforms, which led both to the gradual improvement of the general economic conditions, and to an accelerated process of immigration and urbanization. This resulted in the internal migration of part of the Shiite community to the suburbs of Beirut. Away from their native villages and far from the overbearing authority of their local political bosses (zuama), these Shiite immigrants began to come together as a community, not motivated by religion as much as by concrete economic and social grievances. As such, the new Shiite political activism of the 1950s was mostly channeled through non-Shiite organizations like the Lebanese Communist Party and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party.

At this stage, under the rule of the Shah, the relationship between the Lebanese Shiite community and the Iranian state was minimal and limited to the funding of a number of Shiite social institutions (such as schools). In fact, Iran was involved in Lebanon mostly to counter the appeal of ideologies deemed as radical, like Nasserism, and to ensure the regional status quo. Accordingly, the Shah was mostly allied with the Maronite Christians.

The pattern of involvement gradually started to change by the end of the decade and intensified in the 1960s, coinciding with a shift in the political mobilization of the Lebanese Shiites. This change was possible due to the rise of Musa al-Sadr as charismatic leader of the Shiite community and his distinctively Shiite political movement. Musa al-Sadr, born in Qom, Iran, arrived in Lebanon in 1957, where he became the religious leader of Tyre in southern Lebanon. Although an Iranian national, his agenda was consistently Lebanese, and although a cleric, his campaigns were directed at secular goals. His objective was to unite and empower the Shiite community, as well as increase the community’s political and social rights. Toward these aims, he did not hesitate to enter into alliances with powerful local and regional powers. For example, he solidified ties with the Assad regime in Syria by issuing a fatwa that declared the Alawites a legitimate sect within Shiism.

In this context, Sadr also engaged with the Shah of Iran, accepting Iranian funding of Lebanese Shiite social institutions, but refusing both direct payments as well as attempts to recruit him. The relationship with the Shah, however, began to deteriorate during the 1970s, with Sadr gradually becoming more critical of the Iranian government and with numerous Iranian dissenters finding their way to Lebanon to spread their anti-Shah message and to receive military training (mostly through the PLO).

During the early 1970s, as Lebanon gradually started to drift into civil war, the Shiite community became increasingly organized under Sadr’s leadership. This started with the creation of the first Lebanese-Shiite sociopolitical movement, the Movement of the Dispossessed, Harakat alMahrumim, and continued with the establishment of the movement’s armed wing in 1974, Harakat Amal. 

The civil war, which had a disproportionately heavy impact upon the local Shiite community, and the trauma of the first Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon in 1978 had a powerful effect upon Shiite politicization and militancy. This process was heightened in 1978 with the “disappearance” of Musa al-Sadr, who never returned from a trip to Libya, where he was likely murdered by Qaddafi’s regime. This episode fueled religious fervor among the local Shiites and was compared by some of his followers to the occultation of the twelfth Imam.18 With the disappearance of Sadr, the Shiite community found itself internally divided, with a rising group of clerics, led by mujtahid Sheikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, criticizing Amal’s secular and moderate orientation. In contrast with Amal’s Lebanese, secular, and reformist agenda, this group – comprising mostly people returning from Iraq, where they had been active in the revivalist Shiite movement, Hizb al-Dawa – proposed a new stage of political activism, based on an ideology of self-empowerment grounded in a collective and transnational Islamic identity.

Although until this point the process of political mobilization was mostly a Lebanese affair, the transition from these two separate stages of political activism and the rise of Hizbollah as a transnational and revolutionary Shiite organization in Lebanon could not have developed without the Iranian Revolution. In fact, it was the message of liberation and Shiite empowerment of the Iranian Revolution and its ideological legacy and repercussions across the region that constituted the foundation for the rise of an alternative Lebanese Shiite movement. 

In turn, the ideological affinity between the nascent Lebanese movement and revolutionary Iran, especially with its focus on exporting the revolution, ensured that Iranian involvement and assistance would be present from the outset. Moreover, Iranian involvement in the domestic Shiite community’s affairs was largely seen in a positive light by the Lebanese Shiites: they understood that all the other major parties in the civil war were already backed strongly by foreign powers, and they therefore believed that Iranian involvement would help them address the imbalance. Bolstered by Iranian support, this initially loose coalition of clerics and militants eventually coalesced to form what today is known as Hizbollah, intended as a response to the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon, in 1982. 

An excerpt from, "Israel and Lebanon: A History" By Leslie Susser, My Jewish Learning:

The influx of Palestinian fighters into Lebanon upset the delicate balance between Muslims and Christians in the country and, in 1975, led to civil war. Lebanese Christians seeking to restore the ethnic balance and free the country from growing PLO control looked to Israel for support. The two sides had a common interest: to drive the terrorists from their Lebanese base. Two Christian enclaves supported by Israel were set up in the South. That led to the establishment of the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army under Maj. Saad Hadad.

In 1976, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin met with Christian leader Camille Chamoun on an Israeli missile boat off the Lebanese coast to formalize the arrangement. Israel, Rabin promised, would supply arms and training facilities. Two years later, Rabin’s successor, Menachem Begin, upgraded the alliance, promising Israeli air cover if Christian positions were attacked by Syrian warplanes.

Like Israel, the Syrians had used the civil war to gain a foothold in Lebanon. They had intervened in 1976, first on the side of the Christians, then on the side of the PLO.

With close Syrian support, the PLO grew bolder and in July 1981 launched a huge artillery barrage on northern Israel. War was narrowly averted through last-minute American mediation.

The cease-fire broke down a year later, when Israel launched Peace for Galilee, an operation designed to drive the PLO and the Syrians from Lebanon and pave the way for a peace treaty with the Lebanese Christian leadership under the charismatic Bashir Gemayel.

In June 1982, Israeli ground forces quickly overran PLO positions in southern Lebanon; on August 30, Arafat and the rest of the PLO leaders were forced to leave Lebanon after intense Israeli shelling of Beirut.

Gemayel, elected president in July, spoke of peace with Israel, telling Israeli leaders that he would “come to Jerusalem as a second Sadat.” Two months later he was assassinated, presumably by the Syrians, who wanted to pre-empt the burgeoning Israeli-Lebanese alliance, which they saw as a strategic threat.

The next day, Christian militiamen moved into the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila and butchered more than 300 unarmed civilians. Israel, which had allowed the militiamen into the camps to seek out Palestinian gunmen, was blamed for the massacre. Throughout the war, the world media had been highly critical of Israel and of its defense minister, Ariel Sharon, who was eventually forced to resign after an Israeli commission found him indirectly responsible for the killings.

October 5, 2024

A State of Psychological Siege, Countries Stuck In Time, And The Limits of Repressive Terror


The criminal regimes in America, Israel and Iran are stuck in time and enemies of their own people. The Zionists are bombing hospitals day and night because they're losing on the battlefield. The Mullahs are taking out the eyes of rebellious teenage girls because they can't control the country with religion anymore. And America's fallen and demented leaders are busy with the raping and trafficking of children. 

When real disaster strikes like flooding or earthquakes the so-called leaders of these rotten regimes are nowhere to be found. 

Their days are numbered just like the Soviets. Economic doom is headed their way. Succession crises, legitimacy questions, war fatigue, popular revolts, the whole gambit that comes with societal collapse. 

An excerpt from, "A Candid View of the Middle East: An Interview with Ambassador Hermann Frederick Eilts" Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter 1983:

Forum: Israel has proven its military superiority over its Arab neighborson several occasions. Has this led to a feeling of security?

Eilts: I don't see a great deal of evidence that Israel's military successeshave appreciably altered what is, in effect, an Israeli national paranoia about their security. It has indeed made them feel that for the moment they are a bit more secure, but what worries them is long-term prospects. Right now, they have a qualitative military superiority, but they tend to look around and seek to measure security in quantitative terms. They argue that, taking all the Arab states together, the Arabs have more airplanes, more tanks, more equipment and more wealth, and sooner or later, the qualitative inferiority of the Arabs is going to change. So down the road they fear that once this has happened, i.e., when there is a qualitative improvement in the Arab armies, their security will be threatened. 

So long as the Arabs are not prepared to conclude a peace treaty, with all the obligations - the mutually binding contractual obligations - that this would entail, the Israelis are going to continue to feel a sense of insecurity, despite their impressive military victories. In a sense, this is at the heart of the problem.

The United States provides the Israelis year after year with large quantities of military equipment. In principle I have no problem with this. The Israelis are threatened and they need military equipment, but the more they receive, the greater their capability becomes, the more they seem to be concerned that their security is still in danger. That is a psychological problem for them that is difficult to overcome. One comes back again to the need for peace treaties, contractually binding peace treaties. Such instruments would help, but even then, there would be a period of years before this national security paranoia would begin to abate. They have lived, after all, for thirty years in a state of siege. It is a Festung Israel- type situation. And that cannot be assuaged quickly. It will take time; it will take a gradual normalization of relations; it will take a consciousness on their part that they are accepted in the area and are not viewed simply as a pariah state. I don't expect this sense of insecurity of Israel to change appreciably for a good many years.

. . .

Forum: In recent years, the United States has been at the center of Middle East diplomacy; it has pushed for peace at Camp David, courted the Arab states, and most recently, has sent troops to Lebanon. The Soviets, on the other hand, have been all but excluded from the mainstream of Middle East diplomacy. What are the opportunities and what are the risks inherent in this U.S. assumption of diplomatic leadership in the Middle East?

Eilts: Well, I suppose the greatest opportunity is to bring about some sort of peace settlement which, were it ever possible, would have a stabilizing effect on the area as a whole. The risks are, I think, more numerous. One, the more we are unilaterally involved, the more the belief exists that if the United States really wants to, it can bring about a settlement. They mean not just any kind of settlement, but a settlement which is pro-Arab. Therefore, the argument runs, if the United States does not do this, it shows that the United States does not really want a settlement.

I think that there is one point that is worth bearing in mind in connection with this question and perhaps other questions. It is not realities which count so much in the Middle East, it is perceptions. It is the perception that Arab states have of us that governs some of their actions. And the perception is that the United States can, if it will, bring about peace. Since it is not doing so, there must be some ulterior motive.

Secondly, the more we are unilaterally engaged, the more often our pro-Israeli tilt is demonstrated. Even the effort to be even-handed, on occasion, will require support of Israeli positions. And rightly so, because there are some Israeli positions which are, I think, valid. But each time there is the charge of partiality, i.e., the Americans are working in behalf of Israel. That creates an adverse reaction on the part of Arabs. 

As a matter of fact, President Reagan, reiterating President Carter's comments, has publicly opposed an independent Palestinian state. Carter made the comment that no Arab leader whom he had met favored an independent Palestinian state. I don't know where he got that idea. Most of the Arab leaders do want an independent Palestinian state, and our opposition to an independent Palestinian state does mean that not only in Palestinian eyes, but in other Arab eyes, we are against what the Arabs perceive as fairness. It plays a bit into Soviet hands, and if the Soviets were less clumsy with their Middle East diplomacy, they could make much more out of our active involvement in positions we take than they have been able to do.

The more the United States is unilaterally involved, the more any perceived flaw in a negotiation is blamed upon the United States. Washington incurs the odium for what are seen as positions the Arabs don't like - even what may be fair positions but still in Arab eyes are seen as anti- Arab. So there is a risk in that. One is sticking one's neck out. One could be flailed by the Arab states. And yet they realize that the Soviets can't bring about peace, that only the United States has any chance of doing so.

I don't mind, therefore, incurring some of these risks, provided we do it carefully, provided we know what we are doing, provided we have thought out what our positions should be - oppositions that seek to bridge the differences between the Israeli and Arab points of view - and provided we remain actively involved. At Camp David, as a result of Sadat's urging, the United States agreed to become a "full partner" in the negotiations. Yet we have not been a "full partner" in the first year and a half of the Reagan Administration. I think we have got to get back to being one if the negotiations are to be given a chance. And by that I mean presenting plans of our own. Yes, there are risks involved, but they are risks worth taking. If we don't, nobody else will. If nobody else does, and we don't, the area situation, I think we can count upon it, is going to deteriorate even more in the years ahead.

So we ought to do it, at least as far as I'm concerned. We played a major role in the initial development of the problem, and while I don't accept the view that we are responsible for all of the problems - refugees and others that developed - nevertheless as a great and responsible power, we do have an obligation to international society to actively work for a settlement. And only we can do it. But we must stay the course. We cannot gingerly test the water from time to time and disengage when we think it is too cold and expect to be respected for such inconstancy. We have done too much of this in the past - our quadrenniel election discos, alas, lend themselves to this - and share in the blame for the deplorable area situation. If we have a firm policy, and a fair one, the risks are fewer if we courageously stand by them than if we constantly vacillate.