1. Military necessity. In the absence of a superior military advantage against a bigger foe the possession of just a handful of nuclear weapons can keep external threats at bay. As an Arctic power, and with both the United States and China potentially eying the vast natural resources of Canada, it makes military sense to invest in nuclear weapons for national defense.
There is a threat from below, a threat from above, and a threat from Europe. Geostrategically Canada is in an awkward spot. China can attack the country from the Arctic and the Pacific. America can attack from below. And if a new Russian empire invades Britain and seizes that country it can attack Canada from the Atlantic, Alaska, and the Arctic. None of these scenarios are likely. But what if a Jewish Nazi regime in Washington finds Ottawa's politics unsympathetic and decides to invade without warning tomorrow morning? Without nuclear weapons Canada would not be able to deter any of these potential threats.
2. National survival. Nations without nukes risk destruction at the hands of bigger powers and even their desperate neighbours. Nukes are not a luxury. They are a basic necessity for national survival. For any developed nation a nuclear weapons program is more important than a national banking system, agricultural development, a strong economy. Libya had all those things but no Nukes. Now they have nothing. I'd even advise nations like Haiti and Burkina Faso to get nukes. That will keep the international flies off.
3. Equality before international law. It is not right for certain powers and countries to have nukes and deny that same right to others. The nuclear club is not a sacred institution. It's a small sanctimonious mafia. Laws about nuclear proliferation mean absolutely nothing. There's almost a religious taboo around nukes. Apparently only the Americans, Russians, Chinese, Indians, and the Jews are morally qualified to have them. What about the rest of us? Why can't Canada get some nukes? What makes it less reliable and less capable than a Pakistan, or God forbid, a Ukraine?
4. Power projection. Nations with nukes walk a little differently in the international arena. Even weaker powers like Pakistan and Israel suddenly get expansionist dreams and invade their neighbours, fearing zero consequences. If Lebanon and Afghanistan had nukes they wouldn't have been invaded and attacked multiple times by their nuclear armed neighbours. There's no such opportunity for Canada. We're not taking Alaska with a hundred nukes. But Canada's international clout will increase tremendously if our words are backed by nukes. I don't even know why nations without nukes are given an international forum to give speeches. Words without nukes mean nothing.
II.
An excerpt from, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” by Kenneth Waltz, Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981):
What will the spread of nuclear weapons do to the world? I say ‘spread rather than proliferation’ because so far nuclear weapons have proliferated only vertically as the major nuclear powers have added to their arsenals. Horizontally, they have spread slowly across countries, and the pace is not likely to change much. Short-term candidates for the nuclear club are not very numerous. and they are not likely to rush into the nuclear military business. Nuclear weapons will nevertheless spread, with a new member occasionally joining the club. Counting India and Israel, membership grew to seven in the first 35 years of the nuclear age. A doubling of membership in this decade would be surprising. Since rapid changes in international conditions can be unsettling, the slowness of the spread of nuclear weapons is fortunate.
Someday the world will be populated by ten or twelve or eighteen nuclear-weapon states (hereafter referred to as nuclear states). What the further spread of nuclear weapons will do to the world is therefore a compelling question.
Most people believe that the world will become a more dangerous one as nuclear weapons spread. The chances that nuclear weapons will be fired in anger or accidentally exploded in a way that prompts a nuclear exchange are finite, though unknown. Those chances increase as the number of nuclear states increase. More is therefore worse. Most people also believe that the chances that nuclear weapons will be used vary with the character of the new nuclear states—their sense of responsibility, inclination toward devotion to the status quo, political and administrative competence. If the supply of states of good character is limited as is widely thought, then the larger the number of nuclear states, the greater the chances of nuclear war become. If nuclear weapons are acquired by countries whose governments totter and frequently fall, should we not worry more about the world’s destruction then we do now? And if nuclear weapons are acquired by two states that are traditional and bitter rivals, should that not also foster our concern?
Predictions on grounds such as the above point less to likelihoods and more to dangers that we can all imagine. They identify some possibilities among many, and identifying more of the possibilities would not enable one to say how they are likely to unfold in a world made different by the slow spread of nuclear weapons. We want to know both the likelihood that new dangers will manifest themselves and what the possibilities of their mitigation may be. We want to be able to see the future world, so to speak, rather than merely imagining ways in which it may be a better or a worse one. How can we predict more surely? In two ways: by deducing expectations from the structure of the international political system and by inferring expectations from past events and patterns. With those two tasks accomplished in the first part of this paper, I shall ask in the second part whether increases in the number of nuclear states will introduce differences that are dangerous and destabilizing.
An excerpt from, "The Delicate Balance of Terror" by Albert Wohlstetter, RAND, 1958:
In treating Soviet strategies it is important to consider Soviet rather than Western advantage and to consider the strategy of both sides quantitatively. The effectiveness of our own choices will depend on a most complex numerical interaction of Soviet and Western plans. Unfortunately, both the privileged and unprivileged information on these matters is precarious. As a result, competent people have been led into critical error in evaluating the prospects for deterrence. Western journalists have greatly overestimated the difficulties of a Soviet surprise attack with thermonuclear weapons and vastly underestimated the complexity of the Western problem of retaliation.
One intelligent commentator, Richard Rovere, recently expressed the common view: "If the Russians had ten thousand warheads and a missile for each, and we had ten hydrogen bombs and ten obsolete bombers," ..."aggression would still be a folly that would appeal only to an insane adventurer." Mr. Rovere's example is plausible because it assumes implicitly that the defender's hydrogen bombs will with certainty be visited on the aggressor; then the damage done by the ten bombs seems terrible enough for deterrence, and any more would be simply redundant. This is the basis for the common view. The example raises questions, even assuming the delivery of the ten weapons. For instance, the targets aimed at in retaliation might be sheltered and a quite modest civil defense could hold within tolerable limits the damage done to city targets by ten delivered bombs. But the essential point is that the weapons would not be very likely to reach their targets. Even if the bombers were dispersed at ten different points, and protected by shelters so blast resistant as to stand up anywhere outside the lip of the bomb crater — even inside the fire ball itself — the chances of one of these bombers surviving the huge attack directed at it would be on the order of one in a million. (This calculation takes account of the unreliability and inaccuracy of the missile.) And the damage done by the small minority of these ten planes that might be in the air at the time of the attack, armed and ready to run the gauntlet of an alert air defense system, if not zero, would be very small indeed compared to damage that Russia has suffered in the past. For Mr. Rovere, like many other writers on this subject, numerical superiority is not important at all.
An excerpt from, "It’s Time for Canada to be Bold: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons" by Julie Clark, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, March 2022:
Canada selectively supports non-proliferation regimes such as the NPT and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Officially, Canada strongly supports the NPT as an answer to the nuclear dilemma that generates necessary support among its allies. The focus is on our national security interests in conjunction with our proven partnerships. When it comes to nuclear weapons, there is a balancing act between supporting disarmament and our allied positions and responsibilities. While Canada is fully committed to maintaining the NPT’s success, and reiterates support for global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament goals, it does not support the TPNW. It attributes its hesitancy about the TPNW to rising insecurities in North Korea and the conflict occurring in Ukraine; both are linked to Canada’s commitment to its deterrence alliances. Similarly, Strong, Secure, and Engaged notes that “Canada benefits from the deterrent effect provided by its alliances (e.g. NATO and NORAD), and takes seriously its responsibility to contribute to efforts to deter aggression by potential adversaries in all domains.” Additional concerns have been raised by NORAD regarding Canada’s outdated North Warning System, calling for the modernization of our Arctic radar and missile interception systems. A call that has increased as a priority following Russia’s high nuclear alert. With the goal of maintaining a strong commitment to our alliances, especially NATO, Canada’s position mirrors that of the alliance itself as our global partnerships are integral to our national security.
In December 2020, NATO released a statement in preparation for the TPNW’s entry into force; it overruled the treaty “as it does not reflect the increasingly challenging international security environment and is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture.” The alliance continues to state that the core non-proliferation regime is the NPT since it already promotes global stability and security, and the TPNW would likely weaken the NPT. ICAN has refuted many of NATO’s claims indicating that the TPNW does not prohibit participation in any military alliances and reiterates that the TPNW is the “effective measure” requested in the NPT. The treaty also addresses other concerns NATO has already outlined, since the TPNW was modelled on existing nuclear disarmament plans. NATO again reiterated its steadfast commitment to the NPT and rejection of the TPNW at the Brussels Summit in 2021. While NATO openly supports disarmament and the goal of a nuclear-free world, it reminds the global community that it is a defensive alliance and that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.” On November 30, 2021, NATO’s secretary general discussed the NATO 2030 Initiative and stated: “Nuclear weapons are proliferating,” thus making it less likely the organization will engage further with the TPNW.”
Brief description of the book, "The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon" by Robert Jervis, Cornell University Press, 1989:
In "The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon," Robert Jervis examines how nuclear weapons have fundamentally transformed military strategy and international relations. He argues that the advent of nuclear arms has rendered traditional concepts of military advantage and victory obsolete, as the catastrophic potential of nuclear war makes large-scale conflict unthinkable. Jervis introduces the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), positing that the certainty of total annihilation for all parties involved has led to a stabilizing effect among nuclear-armed states. This paradigm shift has altered the psychology of statesmanship, compelling leaders to adopt more cautious and strategic approaches to foreign policy. Through this analysis, Jervis provides a comprehensive understanding of how nuclear weapons have reshaped the dynamics of global power and the conduct of international affairs.
