"If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle." - Sun Tzu.
"As for the word "Imam," meaning "spiritual guide," this word dominates the form of Islam which will especially concern us here, namely, Shi'ism (also called Imamism) and, above all, Shi'ite Iran. If it is already true to say that cultivated people in the West usually have only an approximate idea of Islamic theology in general, when it comes to Shi'ism, it is to be feared that we are speaking of terra incognita. Some pages in the present book (Ch. 11, 1), as well as the translated texts, may suggest what constitutes its essence. But we could not include here an outline of the history of Shi'ism or explain how and why it became the form of Iranian Islam.
Actually, Iranian Islam belies the opinion according to which Islam is too often identified with an ethnic concept, with the past history of a race. Islam is primarily a religious concept. For centuries, and from his youth up, the Iranian has known his national epic poem contained in the "Book of Kings" by Firdawsi. He is aware that there were great kings and even a prophet, Zarathustra-Zoroaster, before Islam. Yet the Shi'ite Imamology professed by Iran represents the supreme homage that can be paid to the Arabic Prophet and to the members of his Household. The question is one neither of race nor of nation but of religious vision. Again, that is why we would have liked to stress (but cannot do so here) how the relationship between Shi'ism and the principal phenomenon of spiritual Islam, known under the name of Sufism, is regarded in Iran. In any case, suffice it to say that the conditions of the dialogue between Christianity and Islam change completely as soon as the interlocutor represents not legalistic Islam but this spiritual Islam, whether it be that of Sufism or of Shi'ite gnosis.
Even so, the difficulties of approach remain considerable. A Westerner usually takes the terms muslim and mu'min as synonymous. They are, however, by no means synonymous for a Shiite: one can be a muslim and profess Islam without yet (nor for that reason alone) being a mu'min, that is, a true believer, an adept of the holy Imāms and their doctrine. On his side, the mu'min will find it hard to understand immediately the reasons for and import of religious terminology current in the West, where we speak, for example, of the "difficulties of belief"---using the phrase, almost always, with a confessional connotation. This is because the "difficulties" in question depend on a certain concept of philosophy and theology that has accrued during several centuries and, ultimately, on an opposition that is not experienced at all in a milieu where such terms as arif and irfān are in current use. The latter can be translated respectively as "mystical theosophy" and "mystical gnosis," but these technical equivalents do not exactly preserve the familiar shade of meaning in Arabic of these words, which connote a specific type of spiritual knowledge. But does not the very fact that we have no adequate terminology reveal that we are dealing with something which, for us, is not current?
And this, among other things, is what motivates the use of the term "esotericism" because, in this perspective, the polemics between Western believers and unbelievers are seen to have taken place on a plane of knowledge above which neither side was able to rise. For example, there have been arguments about the miracles described in the New Testament. One side acknowledges, the other rejects the possibility of a "breach of natural laws." Belief and unbelief become locked in the dilemma----history or myth? The only way out is to realize that the first and greatest miracle is the irruption of another world into our knowledge, an irruption that rends the fabric of our categories and their necessities, of our evidences and their norms. But it should be understood that the other world in question is one that cannot be perceived by the organ of ordinary knowledge; that it can be neither proven nor disputed by means of ordinary argumentation; that it is a world so different that it can neither be seen nor perceived except by the organ of "Hūrqalyãn" perception.