Mary Bancroft (October 29, 1903, in Boston – January 10, 1997, in New York City) was an American novelist and spy and a member of the Bancroft family, which at one time owned Dow Jones & Company. In 1942, while living in Switzerland, Bancroft was recruited by the Office of Strategic Services, and both worked and had a romantic relationship with Allen Dulles. Her most important work was with Hans Bernd Gisevius, a German military intelligence officer who supplied her with details of the 20 July plot to assassinate Hitler. After the war, Bancroft settled in New York and became a novelist.
An excerpt from, "Autobiography of a spy" by Mary Bancroft, William Morrow and Company, 1983, Pg. 106 - 111:
By the end of August the Czechoslovakian crisis was upon us. Hitler was using the Sudeten German question as an excuse for his Drang nach Osten, that expansion eastward that he had written in Mein Kampf was essential to German survival.
On September 13 we went to hear Thomas Mann read from his works at the Schauspielhaus in Zurich. I was glad to see in person this distinguished writer who had taken refuge in Switzerland and in whose books I had first sensed the decay eating away at the German middle class. But I found that after listening to Hitler, Goering, and Goebbels shouting on the radio, I had difficulty concentrating on Lotte in Weimar. Goethe and his world of values seemed very remote from the world of Adolf Hitler.
The next evening we listened to Goebbels speaking at Nuremberg. The next evening we listened to Goebbels speaking at Nuremberg. We had also listened to Goering's speech that afternoon when he had shouted that he expected the German Air Force to "Fliegen wie die Vogel, nicht Vogeln wie die Fliegen"---a play on words in German that translates as "fly like birds, not fuck like flies."
All day Sunday we listened to the Nuremberg rally, and by Monday night when Hitler spoke, we were in a fine state of nerves. He said nothing of importance for the first forty minutes, then began alluding to an unnamed country whose dastardly behavior could no longer be tolerated. With a deafening shout, he finally identified that country: "Ich spreche von die Tshechoslowaki!" ("I am speaking of Czechoslovakia").
The next day Neville Chamberlain sent word to Hitler that he would like to talk with him to see if peace could be preserved. He would be willing to meet "Mr. Hitler," as Chamberlain persisted in calling him, at any time, at any place convenient to him. Hitler replied he would be delighted to receive Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden. Jean's comment was, " 'Won't you walk into my parlor?' said the spider to the fly." So Chamberlain flew off to Berchtesgaden, and there were those who said Chamberlain should spell his name "J'aime Berlin" ("I love Berlin").
My friend Loranda Spalding and her children came helling out of Germany. Her husband was stationed at the American consulate in Stuttgart and Loranda was convinced war was imminent.
. . .
I had been too emotionally involved with daily developments during the crisis to be able to reflect on its true meaning. Once it was over, I didn't waste any time or energy being angry with Hitler. I didn't expect moral behavior from him or, actually, from the French. But the English? How dare England let Czechoslovakia down! Chamberlain had even informed the Czechs, whose representatives were not permitted to enter the room where the fate of their country was being decided, of what they "ought" to do. Well, I knew what he ought to do!
In some curious way, not only I, but everyone I knew, appeared to have little interest in their personal lives. Rather than living in this world, everyone seemed to be living in their radios. It was not easy to withstand the waves of German propaganda that poured over us. People in every stratum of society were affected by this "war of nerves," as it was called. They would say smugly, "Of course, Goebbels believes in the effectiveness of the Big Lie." But no matter how certain they were that, because they were conscious of this, they personally were immune, more often than not they would be sucked in, not only by the Big Lie but by all manner of little lies.
When, before the Anschluss, Hitler had raged about Germans being slaughtered in Austria and "blood running in the streets of Vienna," the timbre of his voice and his hysterical delivery served to convince people that even if what he was saying were not true, he was going to act as if it were. After the Anschluss, German propaganda became even more effective. The fait accompli of the Anschluss tended to authenticate in people's imaginations the validity of Hitler's threats. It was as if words---lying, boasting, ambiguous and loaded words---had become an army of occupation on the battlefront of the mind, preventing people from thinking for themselves.
What is he going to do next? was the question on everyone's lips---on the street, at the market, whenever or wherever you met anyone you knew. They didn't mean only what country was going to be occupied next. So many values had been under attack for so many years that people waited with bated breath for this wild man to haul some new horror out of his bag of tricks---some intangible new horror, something terrifying and weird that had never been used before.Everything that had been effective at the time of the Anschluss in shaking people up, in causing fights and disputes, not only within different groups and organizations but actually within families, was multiplied a hundredfold at the time of the Czech crisis.False rumors were a particularly effective weapon. One of those rumors that always caused a minor panic was the implication of large troop movements. Every few days there would be a new one. . . .People's minds and emotions were consciously manipulated by the Nazi propaganda machine, and the radio was a particularly lethal instrument in these exercises.In Hitler's case, it was not exclusively Germans who were affected by his speeches. Anyone filled with suppressed envy or rage, anyone economically or spiritually dispossessed, anyone who felt his world of values slipping or anyone harboring a secret will to power was swept along in the wind tunnel created by Hitler's voice.When Hitler did not declare war at the conclusion of his speech at the Nuremberg Party Rally on September 12, 1938, the world heaved a collective sigh of relief. But few realized that one overwhelming reason for this unexpected restraint was that in the last days of September he had watched from behind the curtains of the Reich's Chancellery in Berlin a long and impressive military parade---bands, tanks, all the warlike trimmings---through the streets of Berlin. The crowds on the sidewalks had virtually ignored the parade. Such a display of apathy on the part of a people who loved nothing better than marching bands and military parades was a clear signal to the Fuhrer that the Germans felt the same reluctance for war as the people of other countries. In short, before Hitler spoke at Nuremberg, he realized that he did not yet have the people behind him.
