An excerpt from, "Napoleon On War" Edited By Bruno Colson, Translated By Gregory Elliott, Oxford University Press, 2015, Pg. 337 - 39:
If we are to believe him, Napoleon's Corsican childhood very early on made him understand the difficulties involved in occupying a conquered country:
When the French occupied Corsica in my youth, the government took a lot of trouble to find out what was happening, who had committed what crime, and could not find out, whereas all the inhabitants of Ajaccio knew everything. However great the effort made by the government to win them over, it found it very difficult.
What I saw then has served me in conquered countries: I was never astonished by the hatred that prompts the worst follies and the difficulty we have in securing the submission of some fanatics.
Corsica owes a lot to France. It is not really grateful, people say. France wanted to extinguish hatreds, stop the assassinations that had been encouraged by the weak government in Genoa in order to rule Corsica and dominate it more surely. But the Corsicans could not find that reasonable. It is not enough to render peoples a service; it is further necessary to serve them as they understand it and adapt to their prejudices.
On Saint Helena, Napoleon offered a reflection on fanatics that crosses the ages:
Of all assassins, he continued, fanatics are the most dangerous: only with great difficulty can one protect oneself against the ferocity of such men. A man who has the intention, the desire, to sacrifice himself is always the master of another man's life and, when he is a fanatic, especially a religious fanatic, delivers his blows with all the more assurance. History is teeming with such actions: Caesar, Henri III, Henri IV, Gustavus, Kleber, etc., were among their victims. Religious fanatics, political fanatics, all are to be feared. The accomplices of these tigers, if there are any---for these great criminals often have no accomplices but themselves----are always wrapped in an impenetrable veil that shields them from the most active, most precise searches.General Bonaparte was confronted with an occupied people during his first Italian campaign. Not all Italians greeted the French as liberators. There were several revolts. In Egypt, he faced similar difficulties. To ensure peace and quiet in Cairo, he wrote as follows to the person he had appointed governor:
Great vigilance is more necessary for the peace of the place than a major dispersal of troops. Some duty officers who do the rounds of the city, some orderly sergeants who cross the city on donkeys, some adjutant majors who visit the key places, a few Franks who wend their way in the markets and the various districts, and some reserve companies who can be sent into places where there is a problem---these are more useful and less tiresome than fixed guards in squares and at intersections.One should not fire blanks, but real bullets and live fire directly at the populace. Otherwise, the crowd would become emboldened, and confrontations last longer and involve more casualties:
For, with a rabble, everything depends upon the first impressions made upon them. If they receive a discharge of firearms, and perceive the killed and wounded falling amongst them, a panic seizes them, they take to their heels instantly, and vanish in a moment. Therefore, when it is necessary to fire at all, it ought to be done with ball at first. It is a mistaken piece of humanity, to use powder only at that moment, and instead of saving the lives of men, ultimately causes an unnecessary waste of human blood.Occupation forces should not be dispersed on a national scale, but maintained at a short marching distance, so that they could be concentrated rapidly. Napoleon wrote this several times to his brother Joseph, who had gone to occupy the throne of Naples in 1806:
Be aware that there should not, as it were, be a village in your kingdom that has not seen your troops and yet the inhabitants must not have anything to complain about. It is appropriate not to disperse your forces. It is in fact better to have 600 men who make six journeys to different points, or to send patrols everywhere, but in such a way that the bulk of this corps remains concentrated, than to have the 600 men distributed, with 100 men in each place, to six different points. Endeavour to keep the battalions united.
