An excerpt from, "A Candid View of the Middle East: An Interview with Ambassador Hermann Frederick Eilts" Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter 1983:
Forum: Israel has proven its military superiority over its Arab neighborson several occasions. Has this led to a feeling of security?
Eilts: I don't see a great deal of evidence that Israel's military successeshave appreciably altered what is, in effect, an Israeli national paranoia about their security. It has indeed made them feel that for the moment they are a bit more secure, but what worries them is long-term prospects. Right now, they have a qualitative military superiority, but they tend to look around and seek to measure security in quantitative terms. They argue that, taking all the Arab states together, the Arabs have more airplanes, more tanks, more equipment and more wealth, and sooner or later, the qualitative inferiority of the Arabs is going to change. So down the road they fear that once this has happened, i.e., when there is a qualitative improvement in the Arab armies, their security will be threatened.
So long as the Arabs are not prepared to conclude a peace treaty, with all the obligations - the mutually binding contractual obligations - that this would entail, the Israelis are going to continue to feel a sense of insecurity, despite their impressive military victories. In a sense, this is at the heart of the problem.
The United States provides the Israelis year after year with large quantities of military equipment. In principle I have no problem with this. The Israelis are threatened and they need military equipment, but the more they receive, the greater their capability becomes, the more they seem to be concerned that their security is still in danger. That is a psychological problem for them that is difficult to overcome. One comes back again to the need for peace treaties, contractually binding peace treaties. Such instruments would help, but even then, there would be a period of years before this national security paranoia would begin to abate. They have lived, after all, for thirty years in a state of siege. It is a Festung Israel- type situation. And that cannot be assuaged quickly. It will take time; it will take a gradual normalization of relations; it will take a consciousness on their part that they are accepted in the area and are not viewed simply as a pariah state. I don't expect this sense of insecurity of Israel to change appreciably for a good many years.
. . .
Forum: In recent years, the United States has been at the center of Middle East diplomacy; it has pushed for peace at Camp David, courted the Arab states, and most recently, has sent troops to Lebanon. The Soviets, on the other hand, have been all but excluded from the mainstream of Middle East diplomacy. What are the opportunities and what are the risks inherent in this U.S. assumption of diplomatic leadership in the Middle East?
Eilts: Well, I suppose the greatest opportunity is to bring about some sort of peace settlement which, were it ever possible, would have a stabilizing effect on the area as a whole. The risks are, I think, more numerous. One, the more we are unilaterally involved, the more the belief exists that if the United States really wants to, it can bring about a settlement. They mean not just any kind of settlement, but a settlement which is pro-Arab. Therefore, the argument runs, if the United States does not do this, it shows that the United States does not really want a settlement.
I think that there is one point that is worth bearing in mind in connection with this question and perhaps other questions. It is not realities which count so much in the Middle East, it is perceptions. It is the perception that Arab states have of us that governs some of their actions. And the perception is that the United States can, if it will, bring about peace. Since it is not doing so, there must be some ulterior motive.
Secondly, the more we are unilaterally engaged, the more often our pro-Israeli tilt is demonstrated. Even the effort to be even-handed, on occasion, will require support of Israeli positions. And rightly so, because there are some Israeli positions which are, I think, valid. But each time there is the charge of partiality, i.e., the Americans are working in behalf of Israel. That creates an adverse reaction on the part of Arabs.
As a matter of fact, President Reagan, reiterating President Carter's comments, has publicly opposed an independent Palestinian state. Carter made the comment that no Arab leader whom he had met favored an independent Palestinian state. I don't know where he got that idea. Most of the Arab leaders do want an independent Palestinian state, and our opposition to an independent Palestinian state does mean that not only in Palestinian eyes, but in other Arab eyes, we are against what the Arabs perceive as fairness. It plays a bit into Soviet hands, and if the Soviets were less clumsy with their Middle East diplomacy, they could make much more out of our active involvement in positions we take than they have been able to do.
The more the United States is unilaterally involved, the more any perceived flaw in a negotiation is blamed upon the United States. Washington incurs the odium for what are seen as positions the Arabs don't like - even what may be fair positions but still in Arab eyes are seen as anti- Arab. So there is a risk in that. One is sticking one's neck out. One could be flailed by the Arab states. And yet they realize that the Soviets can't bring about peace, that only the United States has any chance of doing so.
I don't mind, therefore, incurring some of these risks, provided we do it carefully, provided we know what we are doing, provided we have thought out what our positions should be - oppositions that seek to bridge the differences between the Israeli and Arab points of view - and provided we remain actively involved. At Camp David, as a result of Sadat's urging, the United States agreed to become a "full partner" in the negotiations. Yet we have not been a "full partner" in the first year and a half of the Reagan Administration. I think we have got to get back to being one if the negotiations are to be given a chance. And by that I mean presenting plans of our own. Yes, there are risks involved, but they are risks worth taking. If we don't, nobody else will. If nobody else does, and we don't, the area situation, I think we can count upon it, is going to deteriorate even more in the years ahead.
So we ought to do it, at least as far as I'm concerned. We played a major role in the initial development of the problem, and while I don't accept the view that we are responsible for all of the problems - refugees and others that developed - nevertheless as a great and responsible power, we do have an obligation to international society to actively work for a settlement. And only we can do it. But we must stay the course. We cannot gingerly test the water from time to time and disengage when we think it is too cold and expect to be respected for such inconstancy. We have done too much of this in the past - our quadrenniel election discos, alas, lend themselves to this - and share in the blame for the deplorable area situation. If we have a firm policy, and a fair one, the risks are fewer if we courageously stand by them than if we constantly vacillate.
