World War I and II taught us that strong alliances win wars in the modern world, not superpowers, nuclear rogue states, or world conquering leaders and revolutionary movements.
Both wars could have been prevented if the two biggest armies of the continent made a permanent political and security alliance. A united Germany and Russia in the early 20th century would have led to a more peaceful, secure, and free Europe.
But that obviously did not happen.
Over the course of the century one was destroyed through multiple wars and the other via revolution, civil war, and economic suicide known as Communism. They were politically ruined. The somewhat sane monarchs of both empires were replaced by mad revolutionary fanatics.
Since the end of the last century Russia has recovered her national identity, and rationality, but Germany has not. It either does not know its own interests or lacks the strength and character to act to defend them. It is still irrationally consumed with guilt and shame. This fact has derailed its foreign policy and blurred its geopolitical vision. And its political irrationality is disturbing the peace and security of other nations, not just its own.
The needless war in Ukraine could have been prevented had Germany been ruled by an intelligent man like Putin. Instead it is ruled by cowards and imbeciles who go along with every lie and hoax that the degenerates in Washington and London come up with.
Germany now is not a great power or a leader in Europe. The only true European power today is Russia. And that geopolitical reality may only remain true if Putin's successor does not take the country backwards and initiate another cycle of infighting and political turmoil. But rarely in history is a great leader followed by another.
An excerpt from, "German Fear of a Quadruple Alliance, 1904-1905" By Kwang-Ching Liu, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Sep., 1946):
In the two years after the conclusion of the Anglo-French treaty of April 1904, Germany dominated the scene of European politics by a series of extraordinary diplomatic maneuvers. Twice in eight months' time, attempts were made to conclude a treaty of alliance with Russia, first in November 1904 and again in July 1905, during the kaiser's meeting with the tsar at Bjorko. At the same time, a vigorous policy against France was followed on the Moroccan issue. After a period of deliberate silence on the new Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish Moroccan agreements, the kaiser made clear his strong stand for the sultan's authority against the French by his visit to Tangier at the end of March 1905. In the following months, Germany was further to demand an international conference for the purpose of reaching a new Moroccan agreement and to exert pressure on France-to the point of threatening to make war---to remove Delcasse from the foreign ministry.This extraordinary series of diplomatic activities is generally regarded by historians of pre-war diplomacy as Germany's reaction to the Anglo-French entente.To be sure, it has been pointed out that the kaiser also had in mind his own alliance plan-a five-power continental league---in his secret negotiations with the tsar for a treaty of alliance. It is held without doubt, however, that the situation created by the Entente Cordiale was what prompted the kaiser and Bulow to initiate the series of diplomatic moves made by Germany during 1904 and 1905.The Entente Cordiale was, however, not the only important source of worry for Germany during the period. A reexamination of the documents contained in Die grosse Politik shows unmistakably that, as early as 1904, German statesmen were preoccupied with the possibility of an Anglo-Russian rapprochement, which together with the Entente Cordiale would complete the encirclement of Germany. This possibility was very real at the time, because the Russo-Japanese War, which was started two months before the conclusion of the Anglo-French treaty, might have been brought to an early end through French and British mediation. On the basis of a new Far Eastern settlement to be worked out on the occasion of the peace, a quad-ruple alliance (Quadrupelallianz or Viererbund) might be formed, which would embrace the Anglo-Japanese and the Franco-Russian alliances. Several times between December 1904 and August 1905 directors of German policy believed that the Anglo-French mediation had come to the verge of success and that the formation of the alliance was imminent.If the interpretation of the Foreign Office documents presented in this paper is correct, the danger of a new alliance was indeed a more serious and a more immediate concern to the directors of German policy than the situation created by the Entente Cordiale itself. The fear of a new alliance was in fact behind almost every diplomatic step taken by Germany in 1904 and 1905. The two attempts to secure a Russian alliance were made chiefly because of the belief that a German-Russian pact would forestall the possibility of an Anglo-Franco-Russian combination. The Tangier visit and the threat to make war, should Delcasse remain in office, were decided upon at two critical moments when the success of French mediation appeared to be dangerously imminent. They were designed to support Biilow's policy in the Far East as well as in Morocco.The fact that Germany had been so preoccupied with the possibility of an Anglo-Franco-Russian combination indeed obliges us to view the development of the system of alliances before the World War in a new perspective. The German "fear of encirclement" can be said to have begun as early as 1904.
An excerpt from, "The Waning of a Traditional Alliance: Russia and Germany after the Portsmouth Peace Conference" By Bernard F. Oppel, Central European History, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Dec., 1972):
At the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, the traditionally close relationship between Imperial Germany and Tsarist Russia appeared as cordial as ever. Russia had an alliance with France but, except for its lucrative financial advantages for the Russians, this Dual Alliance remained largely an untested one vis-a-vis Germany. Less than a year after the conclusion of peace between Russia and Japan meaningful friendship between Russia and Germany ceased to exist. Within another year, Russia settled her major Asiatic differences with Great Britain, thus completing the process of isolating Germany diplomatically. The culminating period in this deterioration of Russo-German friendship occurred during the seven-month interval between the end of the Portsmouth Peace Conference in September 1905 and Germany's refusal to participate in the international loan to Russia in April 1906. This paper seeks to examine the causes of Russo-German estrangement within the framework of interrelated and often conflicting considerations of German Weltpolitik, Russian military defeats, the Revolution of 1905, and the international aspects of the Moroccan question.
