April 22, 2012

A Collapsing Mythology: The Death of The 9/11 Myth And War on Terror Consensus

A war based on myth does not end on the battlefield, but in the mind.
"Power positions do not yield to arguments, however rationally and morally valid, but only to superior power." - Hans J. Morgenthau.

"History is the long, difficult and confused dream of Mankind." - Arthur Schopenhauer.

"Didn't I tell you
not to be satisfied with the veil of this world?" - Rumi. 

"For historical myths are now commonly perceived as "foundational narratives," as stories that purport to explain the present in terms of some momentous event that occurred in the past. Stories like these are in many ways historical---though rarely, if ever, do they refer to an actual past. Rather, they refer to a virtual past, to the fact that historical communities, like religions or nations, consist in the beliefs that their members have about them---more concretely, in the stories they tell about them." - Joseph Mali. (1).
The period of 1992 to 2012 saw the god-like propaganda power of the American empire on full display. Washington's unbelievable power to distort reality and shape the minds of its global mental subjects was used during this period to sell an aggressive global war on innocent countries. Historians will remember this war as the most evil war in humankind's history.

Washington, and its allies in Israel and England, conquered the global mind by waging the most sophisticated psychological war against humanity, with the focal point of the war being the 9/11 events. No future superpower will ever rival America in its psychological domination of the planet. It is the first and last empire to even be able to attempt such a grand enterprise.

But all dreams must come to an end at some point - that's history. The question is, how many innocent people will suffer and die before the myth of 9/11 is completely done away with? Will it be ten million, or twenty? Genocidal-type figures are not out the question. Based on the logic of U.S. and Israeli war propaganda, the American empire has already wiped Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria off the map. Of course, this is an exaggeration.

But if America can kill one million people, why not ten? What's to stop it? Washington is not governed by a moral conscience, so it literally can kill millions of people and justify its mass murder to the world as an act of liberation. Also, if Israel is allowed to ethnically cleanse Palestinians in broad daylight, then who will stop it from mass murdering other people in the future?

These actions beg the question: Are America and Israel genocidal states?

While Iran is falsely accused of wanting to "wipe Israel off the map," by U.S. and Israeli propagandists, the U.S. and Israel are actually wiping regimes and nations off the map. Their publicly stated goal is to remake the map of the Middle East, which means reducing the territory of several big states, including Iran, and murdering millions of innocent people.

II. The Use of Mythology To Mobilize Public Support for America's Foreign Policy

The biggest factor in whether or not America decides to go to war is the American people, which is why they had to be neutralized with the false flag September 11 events. Since the American people are peaceful, moral, and humanitarian, only the perception that they are under attack from foreigners can activate their war spirit, and that perception was provided by the 9/11 fraud.

Without fear, without state terror, without mass media manipulation, the American people would not support America's conquest of the Middle East. This quixotic project only benefits the private transnational Banksters, fascist multinational corporations, the National Security State, and Israel, all of which have no interest in the survival of America and her liberties. 

In the 2002 book, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO," author Elinor C. Sloan, a defence analyst with the Directorate of Strategic Analysis at Canada's National Defence Headquarters, wrote about the unwillingness of the American people to support big wars. Sloan said:
"Whether true or not, many decision makers now believe that the American people will only support the use of force abroad if it promises smashing victories with few or no casualties. Edward Luttwak has elaborated the view that in future only those forces that are least exposed to casualties, such as high-technology stand-off forces, will be "usable" in a domestic political context." (2).
The lack of American public support for imperialist policies was treated as a problem to be fixed by the American foreign policy establishment. Near the end of the Cold War, when it was clear that the American empire was no longer needed in the world, a new rationale had to be created to justify America's global dominance.

In the 1990s, Washington developed a new rationale for the use of force and it revolved around three big policy objectives: stopping nuclear proliferation, countering international terrorism, and overthrowing "rogue" regimes like Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria, and Iran. In the absence of the Soviet Union and the communist threat, Washington was forced to invent new threats, as well as raise insignificant threats to the status of international problems.

Robert E. Osgood, a foreign policy expert, defined the problem of American foreign policy in his essay, "The Mission of Morgenthau." Osgood said the need to devise a new rationale to justify America's global dominance was imperative because the Cold War was winding down and this massive change created a profound crisis in America's self-image. Osgood wrote:
"The United States finds itself in an unprecedented situation: It faces the task of maintaining the active and extensive engagement of its power in the international arena without a clear and compelling rationale for doing so. For the presumed reduction of the communist threat dampens the security incentive, while disillusionment with the thesis that the United States must prevent piecemeal aggression everywhere for the sake of the world order deprives whatever security incentive there may be of its larger justification in terms of some transcendent purpose. The wave of self-criticism and loss of moral confidence following the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal aggravates the predicament.
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Monetary, trade, energy, law of the seas, and resource issues have now come to the forefront of international politics and the concerns of American foreign policy, while military-security issues have receded to the background. These issues are by their nature uncongenial to the grand designs and great simplifying concepts or "doctrines" that Americans have loved. Who is the enemy, and how can one rally the nation to deter or defeat him?
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Add to these complications the emergence of a variety of claims against the United States and other industrialized states by the poor countries, who are seeking a better economic deal and a redistribution of economic (and hence political) strength in the world. Under the slogans of a "new international economic order" and championed by the developing countries who have discovered the lever of oil prices and supply, these countries appeal to America's conscience while impinging on its economic interests.
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It is little wonder, under these circumstances, that the ambiguous imperatives of power--whether seen in economic, diplomatic, or military terms--should become more difficult to reconcile with the moral principles that Americans have sought to identify with United States policy. In the absence of a compelling anticommunist rationale, the compromises of moral preference that were more or less obscured or tolerated in the Cold War become objects of protest and controversy.
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If this kind of moral dissatisfaction with America's foreign relations fails to provoke a national debate or a moral crisis or even a coherent set of alternatives to the prevailing policies, it is because foreign policy issues are so diffuse and American policy so incoherent.
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One is tempted to conclude that American policy will not recover its coherence until the nation as a whole perceives another overriding threat to its security interests, which will once more provide the basis for reconciling the imperatives of power with the dictates of morality.

Might there arise such a threat to America's economic security? Now that the short-term effect of OPEC's raising of oil prices has been largely absorbed and the prospect of another embargo remains remote, it is hard to think of other threats to America's economic interests that could possibly provide the basis for a new consensus on American security." (3).
The most important point that Osgood made was that, "American policy will not recover its coherence until the nation as a whole perceives another overriding threat to its security interests, which will once more provide the basis for reconciling the imperatives of power with the dictates of morality."

The question of morality lies at the heart of American foreign policy. Is America the benevolent giant, or is it history's most evil empire? After the false flag 9/11 attacks and the criminal invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, most people would say the latter. But even an evil empire needs to feel good about being evil.

The mythology of 9/11 has enabled Washington, London, and Tel Aviv to exercise the power of gods while pretending to be victims of terrorism. There are no words for deception of this scale. It is simply incredible. America's hegemony over the mind of man is even greater than that of Christianity and Islam. America is God of Earth.

Satan has America by the throat. And America has the world by the throat.

Sources:
1. Mali, J. Mythistory: The Making of a Modern Historiography. 2003. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. Pg. 4.
2. Sloan, E.C. The Revolution in Military Affairs. 2002. McGill-Queen's University Press: Montreal and Kingston. Pg. 29.
3.  Osgood, R. E. "The Mission of Morgenthau." From, "Truth And Tragedy: A Tribute To Hans J. Morgenthau." Edited by Kenneth Thompson and Robert J. Myers. 1977. The New Republic Book Co., Inc: Washington D.C. Pg.35-38.